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This	  document	  has	  been	  prepared	  for	  NASA’s	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  (UAS)	  Integration	  in	  
the	  National	  Airspace	  System	  (NAS)	  Project.	  It	  contains	  a	  	  list	  of	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  for	  
remote	  pilot	  stations	  (RPS)	  arranged	  within	  an	  organizing	  structure.	  	  
Many	  US	  and	  international	  agencies	  (including	  RTCA,	  ICAO,	  JARUS,	  and	  the	  FAA)	  are	  working	  to	  
develop	  operational	  concepts	  and	  standards	  to	  enable	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  to	  operate	  
routinely	  in	  the	  civil	  airspace	  system.	  	  Our	  objective	  was	  to	  compile	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  
that	  will	  be	  of	  value	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  agencies.	  	  
It	  was	  not	  our	  intention	  to	  list	  all	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  relevant	  to	  the	  RPS,	  as	  this	  would	  
involve	  replicating	  a	  large	  number	  of	  existing	  guidelines	  for	  cockpit	  design	  and	  other	  human	  
system	  interfaces.	  Instead,	  the	  guidelines	  contained	  in	  this	  document	  are	  intended	  to	  
supplement	  the	  existing	  human	  factors	  literature	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  unique	  aspects	  of	  remotely	  
piloted	  aircraft	  systems	  (RPAS)	  and	  the	  capabilities	  and	  characteristics	  of	  the	  RPS	  that	  will	  be	  
necessary	  to	  enable	  these	  aircraft	  to	  operate	  routinely	  in	  the	  civil	  airspace	  system.	  
The	  reader	  should	  note	  that	  these	  guidelines	  address	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  that	  are	  capable	  
of	  operating	  beyond	  visual	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  in	  all	  classes	  of	  civil	  airspace.	  We	  do	  not	  address	  small	  
remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  that	  are	  operated	  under	  Federal	  Aviation	  Regulation	  107.	  	  
Furthermore,	  although	  our	  focus	  is	  on	  UAS	  operations	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  we	  hope	  that	  our	  
work	  will	  also	  be	  useful	  internationally.	  
This	  document	  is	  being	  made	  available	  for	  input	  and	  feedback.	  It	  will	  be	  revised	  and	  updated	  
periodically	  as	  information	  becomes	  available	  from	  research,	  reader	  comments,	  and	  
operational	  experience.	  Comments	  or	  questions	  can	  be	  sent	  to	  us	  via	  the	  email	  addresses	  on	  
the	  title	  page	  of	  this	  document.	  	  	  
Alan	  Hobbs,	  Ph.D.	  
San	  Jose	  State	  University	  Research	  
Foundation/NASA	  Ames	  Research	  Center	  
Beth	  Lyall,	  Ph.D.	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This	  document	  contains	  a	  list	  of	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  for	  remote	  pilot	  stations	  (RPS)	  
arranged	  within	  an	  organizing	  structure.	  The	  guidelines	  are	  intended	  for	  the	  remote	  pilot	  
stations	  (RPSs)	  of	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  (RPA)	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  operating	  beyond	  visual	  
line-­‐of-­‐sight	  in	  all	  airspace	  classes	  of	  the	  United	  States	  National	  Airspace	  System	  (NAS).	  	  
Numerous	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  and	  standards	  for	  technological	  systems	  have	  been	  
published	  by	  standards	  agencies	  and	  regulatory	  authorities.	  In	  compiling	  this	  document,	  the	  
intent	  was	  not	  to	  reproduce	  or	  re-­‐state	  existing	  human	  factors	  material.	  Instead,	  this	  document	  
focuses	  on	  the	  unique	  issues	  of	  civilian	  RPAS,	  and	  contains	  guidelines	  specific	  to	  this	  sector.	  As	  a	  
result,	  it	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  supplement	  to	  existing	  aviation	  human	  factors	  standards	  and	  
guidance	  material.	  	  	  
Two	  constraints	  were	  used	  to	  focus	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  document.	  First,	  the	  assumptions	  
contained	  in	  the	  FAA	  (2013a)	  UAS	  roadmap	  were	  used	  to	  define	  the	  responsibilities	  that	  will	  be	  
assigned	  to	  the	  pilot	  of	  a	  RPAS	  operating	  beyond	  visual	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  in	  the	  NAS.	  This	  in	  turn,	  
helped	  to	  define	  the	  tasks	  that	  the	  remote	  pilot	  must	  perform	  via	  the	  RPS,	  and	  thereby	  the	  
required	  features	  and	  characteristics	  of	  the	  RPS.	  Second,	  the	  points	  of	  difference	  between	  RPAS	  
and	  conventional	  aviation	  were	  used	  to	  further	  focus	  the	  guidelines	  on	  the	  considerations	  that	  
make	  piloting	  a	  RPA	  significantly	  different	  to	  piloting	  a	  conventional	  aircraft.	  
Five	  broad	  categories	  of	  guidelines	  are	  identified.	  These	  are	  (1)	  performance-­‐based	  descriptions	  
of	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  accomplished	  via	  the	  RPS,	  (2)	  information	  content	  of	  displays,	  (3)	  
descriptions	  of	  control	  inputs,	  (4)	  properties	  of	  the	  interface,	  and	  (5)	  high-­‐level	  design	  
considerations.	  Some	  of	  the	  guidelines	  in	  this	  document	  have	  been	  adapted	  from	  existing	  RPAS	  
human	  factors	  material	  from	  several	  sources,	  including	  RTCA	  publications	  and	  Standardization	  
Agreements	  (STANAGs)	  published	  by	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO).	  The	  use	  of	  
quotation	  marks	  indicates	  that	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  guideline	  remains	  in	  its	  original	  form.	  	  In	  
other	  cases,	  guidelines	  have	  been	  developed	  based	  on	  NASA	  research	  conducted	  under	  the	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UAS	  in	  the	  NAS	  project.	  	  In	  a	  few	  places,	  existing	  aviation	  standards	  or	  general	  human	  factors	  
guidelines	  have	  been	  quoted	  when	  they	  have	  particular	  relevance	  to	  RPAS.	  
Throughout	  this	  document,	  guidelines	  have	  been	  written	  with	  the	  words	  “should”	  or	  “will”	  
except	  in	  cases	  where	  an	  existing	  guideline	  is	  quoted	  that	  contained	  a	  “shall”	  statement	  in	  its	  
original	  form.	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List	  of	  abbreviations	  
	  
ADS-­‐B	   Automatic	  Dependent	  Surveillance	  –	  Broadcast	  
ANSI	   American	  National	  Standards	  Institute	  
ASTM	   ASTM	  International,	  formerly	  American	  Society	  for	  Testing	  and	  Materials	  
ATC	   Air	  Traffic	  Control	  
C2	   Control	  and	  Communications	  
CCTV	   Closed	  Circuit	  Television	  
CFR	   Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations	  
COA	   Certificate	  of	  Waiver	  or	  Authorization	  
COTS	   Commercial	  Off-­‐The-­‐Shelf	  
CPDL	   Controller-­‐Pilot	  Data	  Link	  
CTAF	   Common	  Traffic	  Advisory	  Frequency	  
DAA	   Detect	  and	  Avoid	  
DTED	   Digital	  Terrain	  Elevation	  Data	  
FAA	   Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  
RPS	   Remote	  pilot	  station	  
HFES	   Human	  Factors	  and	  Ergonomics	  Society	  
HMI	   Human-­‐Machine	  Interface	  
ICAO	   International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	  
IFR	   Instrument	  Flight	  Rules	  
IMC	   Instrument	  Meteorological	  Conditions	  
JARUS	   Joint	  Authorities	  for	  Rulemaking	  of	  Unmanned	  Systems	  
MOPS	   Minimum	  Operational	  Performance	  Standards	  
ms	   Millisecond	  
NAS	   National	  Airspace	  System	  
NASA	   National	  Aeronautics	  and	  Space	  Administration	  
NATO	   North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  
PIC	   Pilot	  in	  Command	  
RPA	   Remotely	  Piloted	  Aircraft	  
RPAS	   Remotely	  Piloted	  Aircraft	  System	  
RPS	   Remote	  Pilot	  Station	  
RTCA	   RTCA	  Inc.	  formerly	  Radio	  Technical	  Commission	  for	  Aeronautics	  
STANAG	   NATO	  Standardization	  Agreement	  
TCAS	   Traffic	  Alert	  and	  Collision	  Avoidance	  System	  
UA	  	   Unmanned	  Aircraft	  
UAS	   Unmanned	  Aircraft	  System	  
UAV	   Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicle	  
VHF	   Very	  High	  Frequency	  





The	  terminology	  of	  the	  International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	  (2015)	  is	  used	  throughout	  this	  
document.	  The	  term	  “remotely	  piloted	  aircraft”	  (RPA)	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  aircraft,	  in	  both	  the	  
singular	  and	  plural.	  The	  term	  “remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  system”	  (RPAS)	  is	  used	  when	  the	  intent	  
is	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  entire	  system,	  comprising	  the	  aircraft,	  its	  control	  station,	  communication	  links	  
and	  other	  elements.	  The	  workstation	  of	  the	  remote	  pilot	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “remote	  pilot	  
station”	  (RPS)	  or	  control	  station.	  In	  several	  places,	  it	  has	  been	  necessary	  to	  refer	  to	  documents	  
that	  include	  the	  terms	  “Unmanned	  Aircraft”	  (UA)	  and	  “Unmanned	  Aircraft	  System”	  (UAS).	  
These	  terms	  are	  synonymous	  with	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  and	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  
system	  respectively.	  
	  
Remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  (RPA)	  have	  generally	  experienced	  a	  higher	  accident	  rate	  than	  
conventionally-­‐piloted	  aircraft	  (Nullmeyer	  &	  Montijo,	  2009).	  Many	  of	  these	  accidents	  appear	  to	  
reflect	  the	  unique	  human	  challenges	  associated	  with	  piloting	  a	  UA,	  in	  combination	  with	  remote	  
pilot	  stations	  (RPS)	  that	  have	  been	  designed	  with	  insufficient	  regard	  for	  human	  factors	  
principles	  (Williams,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Human	  factors	  and	  human	  factors	  engineering	  have	  been	  defined	  as	  follows:	  “Human	  factors	  is	  
a	  body	  of	  knowledge	  about	  human	  abilities,	  human	  limitations,	  and	  other	  human	  
characteristics	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  design.	  Human	  factors	  engineering	  is	  the	  application	  of	  
human	  factors	  information	  to	  the	  design	  of	  tools,	  machines,	  systems,	  tasks,	  jobs,	  and	  
environments	  for	  safe,	  comfortable,	  and	  effective	  human	  use”	  (Chapanis,	  1991).	  
	  
The	  remote	  pilot	  stations	  (RPS)	  of	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  systems	  (RPAS)	  range	  from	  
commercial	  off-­‐the-­‐shelf	  laptops,	  to	  sophisticated	  purpose-­‐built	  interfaces	  housed	  in	  shelter	  
trailers	  or	  control	  facilities.	  Although	  some	  RPS	  possess	  aviation	  interfaces	  (such	  as	  sidestick	  
controllers)	  most	  also	  include	  interfaces	  based	  on	  consumer	  electronic	  devices	  such	  as	  screen-­‐
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based	  displays,	  pull-­‐down	  menus,	  and	  “point-­‐and-­‐click”	  input	  devices	  (Scheff,	  2012;	  Waraich,	  
Mazzuchi,	  Sarkani	  &	  Rico,	  2013).	  Widespread	  problems	  have	  been	  identified	  with	  control	  
station	  interfaces.	  Examples	  include	  error-­‐provoking	  control	  placement,	  non-­‐intuitive	  
automation	  interfaces,	  a	  reliance	  on	  text	  displays,	  and	  complicated	  sequences	  of	  menu	  
selection	  to	  perform	  minor	  or	  routine	  tasks	  (Cooke,	  Pringle,	  Pedersen,	  &	  Connor,	  2006).	  	  Some	  
of	  these	  problems	  may	  have	  been	  prevented	  had	  an	  existing	  regulation	  or	  cockpit	  design	  
principle	  been	  applied.	  In	  other	  cases,	  the	  design	  problem	  reflected	  emerging	  issues	  unique	  to	  
RPAS	  that	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  existing	  regulatory	  or	  advisory	  material.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  National	  Aeronautics	  and	  Space	  Administration	  (NASA)	  has	  recognized	  that	  human	  factors	  
guidelines	  for	  the	  RPS	  will	  be	  a	  key	  requirement	  for	  safe	  and	  reliable	  operation	  of	  civilian	  RPAS	  
in	  the	  United	  States	  National	  Airspace	  System	  (NAS).	  As	  part	  of	  the	  NASA	  UAS	  in	  the	  NAS	  
Project,	  the	  agency	  is	  working	  with	  key	  stakeholders	  to	  develop	  recommendations	  for	  RPS	  
human	  factors	  guidelines	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  operating	  beyond	  visual	  line-­‐
of-­‐sight.	  
	  
This	  document	  contains	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  that	  have	  been	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
data	  from	  simulations,	  accident	  and	  incident	  analysis,	  and	  the	  literature	  on	  RPAS	  human	  
factors.	  The	  document	  also	  draws	  together	  existing	  RPAS	  guidelines	  previously	  developed	  by	  
NATO,	  RTCA,	  Access	  5,	  and	  other	  agencies.	  Guidelines,	  by	  definition,	  are	  advisory	  in	  nature.	  
Therefore	  we	  have	  used	  the	  terms	  “should”	  and	  “will”,	  except	  in	  cases	  where	  we	  have	  quoted	  
an	  existing	  regulation	  or	  standard	  without	  modification.	  	  	  
	  
Scope	  of	  the	  current	  activity	  
	  
The	  compilation	  of	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  was	  based	  on	  the	  following	  intentions:	  
a) The	  guidelines	  are	  intended	  for	  RPAS	  capable	  of	  operating	  beyond	  visual	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  
within	  all	  classes	  of	  civilian	  airspace.	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b) RPAS	  operating	  under	  the	  FAA	  small	  rule	  (CFR	  part	  107)	  are	  out	  of	  scope.	  
c) The	  focus	  is	  the	  engineered	  system,	  comprising	  the	  RPS,	  and	  its	  immediate	  
environment.	  Where	  appropriate,	  issues	  such	  as	  maintenance	  or	  ground	  support	  are	  also	  
considered.	  Personnel	  training,	  crew	  qualifications,	  procedure	  design	  and	  physical	  security	  of	  
the	  RPS	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  document.	  	  	  	  	  
d) The	  scope	  is	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  specific	  designs	  or	  technologies.	  	  	  
e) The	  control	  or	  management	  of	  payload	  is	  out	  of	  scope,	  except	  where	  payload	  
considerations	  may	  affect	  the	  safety	  of	  flight.	  	  
f) All	  stages	  of	  flight	  are	  within	  scope,	  from	  flight	  planning	  to	  post-­‐landing,	  including	  
contingencies	  (non-­‐normal	  situations)	  and	  in-­‐flight	  handover,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.	  
g) This	  document	  does	  not	  include	  material	  on	  Detect	  and	  Avoid	  (DAA)	  systems.	  Minimum	  
Operational	  Performance	  Standards	  for	  DAA	  are	  currently	  being	  developed	  by	  RTCA	  Special	  
committee	  228.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Stages-­‐of-­‐flight	  considered	  in	  the	  development	  of	  guidelines.	  
	  
Focusing	  guidelines	  on	  the	  special	  challenges	  of	  RPAS	  operations	  
	  
A	  large	  number	  of	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  and	  standards	  for	  human-­‐machine	  interfaces	  (HMI)	  
have	  been	  published	  by	  standards	  organizations,	  NASA,	  the	  FAA,	  military	  agencies,	  and	  others.	  
A	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  guidelines	  for	  the	  RPS	  could	  conceivably	  include	  re-­‐statements	  of	  all	  of	  
this	  pre-­‐existing	  material.	  Such	  a	  massive	  document	  would	  be	  of	  limited	  use.	  Not	  only	  would	  
most	  of	  the	  material	  be	  available	  elsewhere,	  but	  original	  guidelines	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  locate	  




In	  compiling	  guidelines	  for	  the	  RPS,	  we	  have	  specifically	  decided	  not	  to	  produce	  a	  
comprehensive	  set	  of	  human	  factors	  guidelines,	  but	  instead	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  special	  challenges	  
that	  will	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  RPAS	  in	  the	  United	  States	  National	  Airspace	  System.	  	  
Therefore,	  this	  set	  of	  guidelines	  is	  intended	  to	  supplement,	  rather	  than	  replace,	  existing	  
material	  on	  cockpit	  design.	  	  
	  
Most	  of	  the	  guidelines	  included	  in	  this	  document	  are	  RPAS-­‐specific	  and	  deal	  with	  issues	  that	  are	  
not	  covered	  by	  guidelines	  typically	  used	  in	  the	  aviation	  industry.	  In	  a	  few	  parts	  of	  this	  document	  
however,	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  re-­‐state	  general	  human	  factors	  principles	  that	  have	  particular	  
applicability	  to	  RPAS,	  particularly	  when	  we	  have	  found	  evidence	  that	  the	  principle	  has	  been	  
overlooked	  by	  the	  designers	  of	  existing	  RPS.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  current	  effort	  has	  been	  guided	  by	  two	  complementary	  defining	  constraints.	  First,	  we	  have	  
used	  a	  set	  of	  assumptions	  published	  by	  the	  FAA	  to	  define	  the	  types	  of	  operations	  that	  will	  be	  
permitted	  in	  the	  NAS.	  These	  assumptions	  determine	  the	  capabilities	  that	  RPAS	  must	  possess	  
and	  the	  tasks	  that	  the	  pilot	  must	  be	  able	  to	  perform.	  Second,	  we	  have	  identified	  the	  special	  
challenges	  presented	  by	  RPAS,	  and	  have	  focused	  on	  compiling	  guidelines	  relevant	  to	  these	  
issues.	  These	  challenges	  are	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  “deltas”,	  meaning	  the	  additional	  
considerations	  that	  apply	  to	  RPAS	  operations	  over	  and	  above	  those	  applying	  to	  conventionally-­‐




Figure	  2.	  Control	  and	  communication	  responsibilities	  of	  a	  RPAS	  pilot	  operating	  in	  the	  NAS.	  
FAA	  assumptions	  
	  
The	  FAA	  (2013a)	  roadmap	  for	  integration	  of	  RPAS	  into	  the	  National	  Airspace	  System	  includes	  a	  
set	  of	  assumptions	  that	  will	  guide	  how	  civil	  RPAS	  operating	  beyond	  visual	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  of	  the	  
pilot	  will	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  NAS.	  These	  assumptions	  are	  reproduced	  verbatim	  in	  Table	  1	  
below.	  Several	  of	  the	  assumptions	  imply	  specific	  requirements	  that	  help	  to	  define	  the	  nature	  of	  
RPAS	  operations	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  pilot.	  For	  example,	  from	  assumption	  three	  it	  follows	  that	  
the	  pilot	  will	  comply	  with	  Instrument	  Flight	  Rules	  (IFR)	  procedures	  and	  will	  operate	  the	  aircraft	  
on	  designated	  air	  routes.	  Assumption	  six	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  role	  for	  a	  pilot	  in	  
command,	  and	  that	  the	  control	  of	  multiple	  RPA	  by	  one	  pilot	  is	  not	  envisioned.	  Assumption	  
seven	  requires	  that	  the	  pilot	  will	  have	  on-­‐the-­‐loop	  or	  in-­‐the-­‐loop	  control	  authority.	  This	  in	  turn,	  
implies	  that	  the	  RPS	  must	  keep	  the	  pilot	  informed	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  aircraft	  and	  its	  systems.	  
From	  assumption	  13,	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  pilot	  will	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  communicate	  with	  Air	  
Traffic	  Control	  (ATC),	  and	  will	  be	  capable	  of	  complying	  with	  ATC	  instructions	  as	  effectively	  as	  a	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pilot	  of	  a	  conventionally-­‐piloted	  aircraft.	  Figure	  2	  (above)	  shows	  a	  simplified	  representation	  of	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  remote	  pilot	  when	  operating	  as	  a	  full	  participant	  in	  the	  NAS.	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Assumptions	  from	  FAA	  UAS	  roadmap	  
1.	  UAS	  operators	  comply	  with	  existing,	  adapted,	  and/or	  new	  operating	  rules	  or	  procedures	  as	  a	  
prerequisite	  for	  NAS	  integration.	  
2.	  Civil	  UAS	  operating	  in	  the	  NAS	  obtain	  an	  appropriate	  airworthiness	  certificate	  while	  public	  
users	  retain	  their	  responsibility	  to	  determine	  airworthiness.	  
3.	  All	  UAS	  must	  file	  and	  fly	  an	  IFR	  flight	  plan.	  
4.	  All	  UAS	  are	  equipped	  with	  ADS-­‐B	  (Out)	  and	  transponder	  with	  altitude-­‐encoding	  capability.	  
This	  requirement	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  FAA’s	  rule-­‐making	  for	  ADS-­‐B	  (Out).	  
5.	  UAS	  meet	  performance	  and	  equipage	  requirements	  for	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  are	  
operating	  and	  adhere	  to	  the	  relevant	  procedures.	  
6.	  Each	  UAS	  has	  a	  flight	  crew	  appropriate	  to	  fulfill	  the	  operators’	  responsibilities,	  and	  includes	  a	  
pilot-­‐in-­‐command	  (PIC).	  Each	  PIC	  controls	  only	  one	  UA.	  
7.	  Autonomous	  operations	  are	  not	  permitted.	  The	  PIC	  has	  full	  control,	  or	  override	  authority	  to	  
assume	  control	  at	  all	  times	  during	  normal	  UAS	  operations.	  
8.	  Communications	  spectrum	  is	  available	  to	  support	  UAS	  operations.	  
9.	  No	  new	  classes	  or	  types	  of	  airspace	  are	  designated	  or	  created	  specifically	  for	  UAS	  operations.	  
10.	  FAA	  policy,	  guidelines,	  and	  automation	  support	  air	  traffic	  decision-­‐makers	  on	  assigning	  
priority	  for	  individual	  flights	  (or	  flight	  segments)	  and	  providing	  equitable	  access	  to	  airspace	  and	  
air	  traffic	  services.	  
11.	  Air	  traffic	  separation	  minima	  in	  controlled	  airspace	  apply	  to	  UA.	  
12.	  ATC	  is	  responsible	  for	  separation	  services	  as	  required	  by	  airspace	  class	  and	  type	  of	  flight	  
plan	  for	  both	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  aircraft.	  
13.	  The	  UAS	  PIC	  complies	  with	  all	  ATC	  instructions	  and	  uses	  standard	  phraseology	  per	  FAA	  
Order	  (JO)	  7110.65	  and	  the	  Aeronautical	  Information	  Manual	  (AIM).	  
14.	  ATC	  has	  no	  direct	  link	  to	  the	  UA	  for	  flight	  control	  purposes.	  
FAA	  (2013a).	  Integration	  of	  Civil	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  (UAS)	  in	  the	  National	  Airspace	  




Special	  considerations	  of	  RPAS	  	  
	  
RPAS	  share	  many	  of	  the	  same	  human	  factors	  considerations	  that	  apply	  in	  conventionally-­‐
piloted	  aircraft;	  however	  the	  points	  of	  difference	  have	  implications	  for	  RPS	  design	  (Kaliardos	  &	  
Lyall,	  2014).	  These	  special	  considerations	  are	  listed	  in	  Table	  2	  below	  and	  are	  described	  in	  detail	  
in	  the	  sections	  that	  follow.	  The	  guidelines	  in	  this	  document	  are	  intended	  to	  address	  human	  
factors	  challenges	  that	  exist	  within	  the	  problem	  space	  defined	  by	  these	  eight	  broad	  
considerations.	  
	  
Table	  2.	  	  Special	  considerations	  of	  RPAS	  with	  implications	  for	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  
	   A.	  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing	  
	   B.	  Control	  and	  communication	  via	  radio	  link	  	  
	   C.	  The	  unique	  environment	  of	  the	  control	  station	  	   	  
	   D.	  In-­‐flight	  transfer	  of	  control	  
	   E.	  Unique	  flight	  characteristics	  of	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  
	   F.	  Flight	  termination	  	  
	   G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation	  
	   H.	  Widespread	  use	  of	  interfaces	  based	  on	  consumer	  products	  
	  
	  
A. Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing	  
	  
Potential	  for	  reduced	  awareness	  of	  aircraft	  state:	  The	  rich	  sensory	  cues	  available	  to	  the	  pilot	  of	  
a	  conventional	  aircraft	  include	  visual,	  auditory,	  proprioceptive	  and	  olfactory	  sensations.	  The	  
absence	  of	  these	  cues	  when	  operating	  a	  RPAS	  can	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  the	  pilot	  to	  




Implications	  for	  error-­‐self	  correction:	  	  Observations	  of	  airline	  pilots	  have	  indicated	  that	  “pilot	  
error”	  is	  a	  relatively	  frequent	  event,	  yet	  most	  of	  these	  errors	  are	  rapidly	  identified	  and	  
corrected	  by	  the	  crews	  themselves	  before	  any	  consequences	  occur	  (ICAO,	  2002).	  The	  remote	  
pilot,	  no	  longer	  co-­‐located	  with	  their	  aircraft,	  may	  have	  more	  difficulty	  identifying	  and	  self-­‐
correcting	  errors.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Collision	  avoidance	  and	  separation	  assurance:	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  out-­‐the-­‐window	  view,	  the	  
pilot	  must	  rely	  on	  alternative	  sources	  of	  information,	  and	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  comply	  with	  ATC	  
visual	  clearances	  by	  direct	  visual	  reference.	  In	  the	  cruise	  flight	  phase,	  a	  remote	  pilot	  lacking	  
information	  from	  an	  out-­‐the-­‐window	  view	  may	  be	  in	  a	  comparable	  situation	  to	  the	  pilot	  of	  a	  
conventional	  aircraft	  during	  flight	  in	  instrument	  meteorological	  conditions	  (IMC).	  	  However,	  the	  
comparison	  between	  conventional	  instrument	  flying	  and	  RPAS	  operations	  may	  not	  apply	  when	  
the	  RPA	  is	  on	  the	  ground	  or	  in	  terminal	  airspace.	  The	  awareness	  of	  the	  surrounding	  
environment	  provided	  by	  an	  out-­‐the-­‐window	  view	  may	  be	  particularly	  critical	  during	  taxiing	  and	  
takeoff,	  and	  during	  the	  approach	  and	  landing	  phases.	  	  In	  collaboration	  with	  RTCA	  Special	  
Committee	  228,	  NASA	  is	  conducting	  studies	  to	  define	  the	  requirements	  for	  RPAS	  traffic	  displays	  
to	  enable	  RPA	  to	  detect	  and	  avoid	  other	  aircraft.	  	  
	  
Foveal	  bottleneck:	  Some	  RPAS	  designers	  have	  attempted	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  rich	  
sensory	  cues	  with	  text-­‐based	  displays	  in	  the	  RPS.	  However,	  this	  risks	  overloading	  the	  visual	  
channel	  of	  the	  pilot	  by	  requiring	  the	  pilot	  to	  invest	  the	  limited	  resource	  of	  foveal	  vision	  to	  
obtain	  information	  that	  would	  be	  available	  to	  a	  conventional	  pilot	  via	  other	  sensory	  channels,	  
including	  peripheral	  vision.	  	  	  
	  
Potential	  for	  perceptual	  illusions	  or	  distortions	  related	  to	  on-­‐board	  cameras:	  If	  an	  on-­‐board	  
camera	  is	  used	  to	  assist	  with	  piloting	  tasks,	  there	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  perceptual	  illusions	  or	  
distortions	  that	  do	  not	  occur	  in	  conventional	  aviation.	  Camera	  views	  can	  produce	  misleading	  
depth	  cues,	  some	  of	  which	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  binocular	  cues.	  Misleading	  cues	  may	  
be	  particularly	  noticeable	  during	  takeoff	  or	  landing.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  moveable	  camera	  located	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on	  board	  a	  RPA	  is	  not	  aligned	  as	  expected	  by	  the	  pilot,	  or	  moves	  unexpectedly,	  there	  may	  be	  an	  
illusion	  of	  yaw,	  or	  other	  undesired	  aircraft	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
B. Control	  and	  communication	  via	  radio	  link	  
	  
Figure	  3	  illustrates	  the	  control	  and	  communication	  links	  connecting	  the	  remote	  pilot	  station	  with	  the	  
RPA.	  The	  link	  may	  involve	  terrestrial	  radio	  or	  satellite	  links,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  two.	  	  
	   	  
Figure	  3.	  A	  representation	  of	  the	  links	  between	  the	  RPS	  and	  the	  RPA.	  
	  
Control	  latencies:	  The	  transmission	  of	  radio	  signals,	  and	  the	  associated	  processing,	  may	  
introduce	  operationally	  significant	  delays	  between	  pilot	  control	  input,	  aircraft	  response	  
execution,	  and	  display	  of	  the	  response	  to	  the	  pilot.	  These	  latencies	  will	  be	  particularly	  
noticeable	  when	  the	  link	  is	  via	  a	  geostationary	  satellite,	  however,	  terrestrial	  radio	  systems	  may	  
also	  introduce	  significant	  latencies.	  	  
	  
Voice	  latencies:	  In	  controlled	  airspace,	  most	  communication	  between	  pilots	  and	  ATC	  occur	  over	  
VHF	  radio.	  All	  pilots	  on	  the	  same	  frequency	  are	  able	  to	  monitor	  transmissions	  due	  to	  the	  “party	  
line”	  nature	  of	  the	  radio.	  This	  provides	  situation	  awareness,	  and	  also	  enables	  pilots	  to	  time	  
their	  transmissions	  to	  minimize	  “step-­‐ons”,	  in	  which	  two	  people	  attempt	  to	  transmit	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simultaneously.	  In	  busy	  airspace,	  it	  can	  become	  challenging	  to	  identify	  the	  brief	  gaps	  in	  which	  
transmissions	  can	  be	  made.	  	  
The	  near-­‐term	  communication	  and	  control	  architecture	  being	  developed	  for	  RPAS	  operations	  in	  
the	  NAS	  will	  involve	  a	  digital	  relay	  of	  remote	  pilot	  voice	  communications	  	  from	  the	  ground	  to	  
the	  UA,	  from	  where	  the	  message	  will	  be	  converted	  to	  analogue	  form,	  and	  re-­‐broadcast	  over	  
VHF	  radio.	  The	  transmissions	  of	  other	  pilots	  and	  controllers	  will	  be	  relayed	  to	  the	  remote	  pilot	  
using	  the	  same	  system.	  The	  relay	  of	  voice	  communications	  from	  the	  RP	  via	  the	  RPA	  will	  
introduce	  a	  delay	  between	  the	  communications	  of	  the	  remote	  pilot	  with	  reference	  to	  other	  
pilots	  on	  frequency.	  This	  delay	  will	  be	  most	  noticeable	  when	  a	  satellite	  link	  is	  involved.	  Most	  of	  
this	  latency	  will	  be	  due	  to	  processing	  before	  and	  after	  signal	  transmission.	  In	  order	  to	  
seamlessly	  integrate	  RPAS	  into	  the	  NAS,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  that	  the	  latency	  introduced	  into	  the	  
voice	  communications	  of	  remote	  pilots	  does	  not	  reach	  a	  level	  that	  disrupts	  communication.	  	  
	  
Link	  management:	  In	  addition	  to	  flying	  the	  aircraft,	  the	  pilot	  must	  manage	  and	  monitor	  the	  
Control	  and	  Communications	  (C2)	  link.	  This	  requires	  the	  pilot	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  current	  status	  
of	  the	  control	  link,	  anticipate	  potential	  changes	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  link	  as	  the	  flight	  progresses,	  
and	  diagnose	  and	  respond	  to	  any	  changes	  that	  occur.	  The	  pilot	  may	  be	  required	  to	  interact	  with	  
security	  features	  designed	  to	  prevent	  unauthorized	  persons	  from	  taking	  control	  of	  the	  RPA	  or	  
interfering	  with	  the	  control	  link.	  In	  the	  event	  of	  a	  link	  interruption,	  the	  RPA	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  
continued	  flight	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  pilot	  and	  air	  traffic	  control.	  	  	  	  
	  
A	  lost	  link	  event	  can	  consist	  of	  three	  stages,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4.	  In	  stage	  1,	  the	  link	  has	  been	  
interrupted,	  but	  the	  aircraft	  continues	  to	  fly	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  last	  command	  received	  
from	  the	  pilot.	  Some	  link	  outages	  will	  last	  a	  few	  milliseconds	  (ms),	  whereas	  others	  may	  extend	  
for	  minutes	  or	  even	  hours.	  It	  would	  be	  disruptive	  if	  the	  RPA	  started	  to	  fly	  its	  lost	  link	  procedure	  
each	  time	  a	  brief	  link	  interruption	  occurred.	  Therefore,	  an	  on-­‐board	  timer	  is	  needed	  to	  measure	  
the	  duration	  of	  the	  outage,	  and	  activate	  the	  lost	  link	  procedure	  after	  a	  pre-­‐set	  interval	  has	  
elapsed.	  In	  the	  terminal	  area,	  the	  lost	  link	  procedure	  may	  need	  to	  commence	  after	  an	  outage	  of	  
a	  few	  seconds.	  Elsewhere,	  the	  RPA	  may	  be	  able	  to	  safely	  continue	  along	  its	  planned	  flightpath	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for	  an	  extended	  period	  before	  entering	  its	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  In	  stage	  2	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  event,	  the	  
RPA’s	  pre-­‐programmed	  lost	  link	  procedure	  is	  activated.	  Different	  lost	  link	  procedures	  will	  be	  
appropriate	  according	  to	  the	  location	  of	  the	  aircraft	  and	  the	  stage	  of	  flight.	  The	  RPA	  pilot	  must	  
therefore	  remain	  aware	  of	  the	  current	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  In	  the	  third	  stage	  of	  the	  lost	  link	  
sequence,	  the	  link	  is	  re-­‐established	  and	  the	  aircraft	  transitions	  back	  to	  pilot	  control.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  Stages	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  event.	  
	  
C.	  The	  unique	  environment	  of	  	  the	  control	  station	  	  
	  
The	  remote	  pilot	  station	  (RPS),	  located	  remote	  to	  the	  aircraft,	  is	  likely	  to	  increasingly	  resemble	  
a	  control	  room	  rather	  than	  a	  cockpit.	  Guidelines	  may	  cover	  not	  only	  the	  human-­‐machine	  
interface	  (HMI),	  but	  also	  the	  physical	  environment	  of	  the	  RPS,	  including	  noise	  levels,	  access	  
controls,	  temperature	  control,	  and	  lighting.	  
	  
Potential	  to	  add	  displays:	  The	  relative	  spaciousness	  of	  the	  RPS	  compared	  to	  a	  traditional	  
cockpit	  enables	  additional	  screens	  to	  be	  added	  easily	  and	  without	  the	  forethought	  that	  would	  
be	  needed	  to	  add	  them	  to	  a	  cockpit.	  A	  proliferation	  of	  information	  displays	  can	  affect	  the	  pilot’s	  
performance	  and	  interaction	  with	  the	  RPS.	  Consideration	  will	  need	  to	  be	  given	  to	  determining	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whether	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  display	  to	  the	  RPS	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  significant	  or	  minor	  
modification	  for	  RPS	  design	  and	  certification	  purposes.	  
	  
Ability	  of	  maintenance	  personnel	  to	  access	  the	  RPS	  during	  flight:	  Current	  RPAS	  operations	  
sometimes	  involve	  in-­‐flight	  troubleshooting	  such	  as	  diagnosing	  and	  correcting	  console	  lock-­‐ups,	  
software	  problems,	  and	  problems	  with	  cable	  connections.	  In	  contrast	  to	  conventional	  aviation,	  
RPAS	  maintenance	  personnel	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  pilot	  station	  during	  
flight	  operations,	  and	  may	  have	  hands-­‐on	  interactions	  with	  the	  RPS	  while	  a	  flight	  is	  underway.	  
As	  a	  result,	  maintenance	  errors	  may	  have	  an	  immediate	  operational	  impact	  (Hobbs	  &	  Herwitz,	  
2008).	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
D.	  In-­‐flight	  transfer	  of	  control	  	  
	  
Control	  of	  a	  RPA	  may	  be	  transferred	  during	  flight	  operations	  between	  pilots	  at	  the	  same	  control	  
station	  console,	  between	  consoles	  at	  the	  same	  control	  station,	  or	  between	  physically	  separated	  
control	  stations	  (Williams,	  2006).	  These	  handovers	  can	  be	  a	  time	  of	  particular	  risk,	  associated	  
with	  system	  mode	  errors	  and	  coordination	  breakdowns.	  For	  example,	  there	  have	  been	  cases	  of	  
inadvertent	  transfer	  of	  control	  between	  RPS	  due	  to	  controls	  set	  in	  error.	  The	  control	  of	  a	  long-­‐
endurance	  aircraft	  may	  be	  transferred	  multiple	  times	  during	  the	  course	  of	  a	  single	  flight	  
(Tvaryanas,	  2006),	  with	  each	  handover	  contributing	  to	  a	  cumulative	  level	  of	  risk.	  	  	  	  
	  
E.	  Unique	  characteristics	  of	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  	  
	  
Compared	  to	  conventionally-­‐piloted	  aircraft,	  RPA	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  unconventional	  flight	  
characteristics.	  They	  may	  fly	  at	  lower	  speeds,	  climb	  and	  descend	  more	  slowly,	  and	  be	  more	  
likely	  to	  loiter	  over	  a	  location	  than	  fly	  point-­‐to-­‐point.	  The	  human	  factors	  implications	  of	  these	  
characteristics	  may	  include	  a	  reduced	  ability	  to	  rapidly	  comply	  with	  ATC	  instructions,	  and	  a	  
need	  for	  “North	  up”	  moving	  map	  displays	  that	  adapted	  for	  flights	  with	  frequent	  changes	  of	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track.	  RPAS	  operations	  may	  also	  start	  and	  end	  with	  launch	  and	  recovery	  systems	  rather	  than	  
conventional	  runways,	  changing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  pilot’s	  task.	  	  	  
	  
Extended	  periods	  of	  low	  workload:	  A	  challenge	  for	  the	  designer	  of	  the	  RPS	  is	  to	  maintain	  pilot	  
engagement	  during	  extended	  periods	  of	  low	  workload,	  particularly	  when	  the	  pilot’s	  role	  is	  to	  
perform	  supervisory	  control	  of	  automation	  (Cummings,	  Mastracchio,	  Thornburg,	  &	  Mkrtchyan,	  
2013).	  In	  addition,	  the	  pilot	  must	  be	  prepared	  for	  rapid	  increases	  in	  workload	  during	  
emergencies	  or	  non-­‐normal	  situations.	  	  	  
	  
F.	  Flight	  termination	  
	  
In	  an	  emergency,	  the	  pilot	  of	  a	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft	  may	  be	  required	  to	  perform	  an	  off-­‐
airport	  landing,	  or	  otherwise	  terminate	  the	  flight	  by	  a	  controlled	  impact,	  ditching,	  or	  other	  
method.	  	  Although	  no	  lives	  are	  at	  stake	  on	  board	  the	  aircraft1,	  the	  pilot	  is	  still	  responsible	  for	  
the	  safety	  of	  other	  users	  of	  the	  NAS,	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  life	  and	  property	  on	  the	  ground.	  The	  
RPS	  must	  provide	  the	  information	  needed	  for	  pilot	  decision-­‐making	  and	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  
issue	  the	  necessary	  commands	  to	  the	  UA.	  The	  risk	  of	  inadvertent	  activation	  of	  the	  flight	  
termination	  system	  must	  also	  be	  considered	  (Hobbs,	  2010).	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation	  
	  
Many	  conventional	  transport	  aircraft	  designs	  incorporate	  sophisticated	  automated	  systems,	  
however	  the	  pilot	  of	  a	  conventional	  civilian	  aircraft	  will	  generally	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  turn-­‐off	  or	  
minimize	  the	  use	  of	  the	  automated	  systems	  and	  exert	  manual	  control	  of	  the	  aircraft,	  even	  if	  
this	  is	  via	  fly-­‐by-­‐wire	  systems.	  Most	  current	  designs	  of	  advanced	  RPA	  rely	  entirely	  on	  
automated	  systems	  for	  basic	  flight	  control,	  and	  do	  not	  provide	  options	  for	  pilot	  manual	  control.	  
Instead,	  the	  remote	  pilot	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  supervisory	  control	  of	  the	  automation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  We	  assume	  that	  RPA	  will	  not	  carry	  passengers.	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Therefore	  manual	  flight	  control	  becomes	  less	  of	  an	  issue	  for	  the	  remote	  pilot,	  making	  
automation	  management	  issues	  of	  critical	  importance.	  	  	  
	  	  
H.	  Widespread	  use	  of	  interfaces	  based	  on	  consumer	  products	  	  
	  
Remote	  pilot	  stations	  (RPS)	  increasingly	  resemble	  office	  workstations,	  with	  keyboard,	  mouse	  or	  
trackball	  interface	  devices,	  and	  displays	  based	  on	  computer	  screens.	  In	  many	  cases,	  interfaces	  
have	  not	  been	  designed	  in	  accord	  with	  aviation	  regulations	  or	  standards.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  
interfaces	  operate	  on	  consumer	  computer	  software.	  Observed	  problems	  have	  included	  a	  heavy	  
reliance	  on	  textual	  information,	  complicated	  sequences	  of	  menu	  selection	  required	  to	  perform	  
time-­‐critical	  or	  frequent	  tasks,	  and	  screen	  displays	  that	  can	  be	  obscured	  behind	  pop-­‐up	  
windows	  or	  dialog	  boxes.	  A	  RPS	  that	  contains	  controls	  and	  displays	  sourced	  from	  diverse	  
commercial	  off-­‐the-­‐shelf	  (COTS)	  providers	  is	  likely	  to	  suffer	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  consistency	  and	  other	  
integration	  issues.	  This	  may	  result	  in	  increased	  crew	  training	  requirements,	  reduced	  efficiency,	  
and	  an	  increased	  potential	  for	  operator	  errors.	  	  	  
	  
Overview	  of	  existing	  relevant	  guidelines	  
	  
A	  range	  of	  existing	  sources	  provide	  guidance	  and	  requirements	  that	  may	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  
design	  of	  the	  RPS.	  As	  shown	  in	  Appendix	  1,	  these	  include	  human	  factors	  material	  from	  the	  FAA,	  
EASA,	  and	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  as	  well	  as	  general	  standards	  relevant	  to	  HMI	  design.	  	  The	  
current	  project	  is	  not	  the	  first	  to	  address	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  for	  RPS.	  In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  
the	  “Access	  5”	  program	  made	  progress	  in	  developing	  human	  system	  integration	  guidance	  for	  
RPS	  focusing	  on	  operations	  above	  Flight	  Level	  430	  (Berson,	  Gershzohn,	  Wolf	  &	  Schultz,	  2005).	  	  
The	  Office	  of	  the	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  (2012)	  released	  a	  RPS	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
development	  and	  standardization	  guide	  for	  military	  RPAS.	  The	  most	  recent	  version	  of	  Military	  
Standard	  1472G	  (Human	  Engineering)	  includes	  a	  brief	  section	  on	  RPAS	  interface	  design	  
(Department	  of	  Defense,	  2012).	  Material	  touching	  on	  the	  human	  factors	  of	  military	  RPS	  has	  also	  
been	  produced	  by	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  in	  Standardization	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Agreements	  (2007,	  2009).	  	  Agencies	  such	  as	  ASTM	  (2007,	  2014),	  RTCA	  (2007,	  2010,	  2013)	  and	  
the	  International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	  (ICAO,	  2011)	  are	  also	  addressing	  the	  issues	  of	  RPAS	  
integration.	  	  
	  
Much	  of	  the	  preceding	  work	  dealt	  with	  military	  applications,	  or	  provided	  general	  
comprehensive	  human	  factors	  guidelines	  for	  system	  designers.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  current	  project	  
has	  a	  narrower	  focus,	  limited	  to	  the	  special	  requirements	  of	  civilian	  RPAS	  operations.	  
	  
Types	  of	  guidelines	  
	  
Several	  areas	  where	  guidelines	  may	  be	  useful	  can	  be	  identified	  by	  asking	  the	  questions	  shown	  
in	  Figure	  5.	  The	  process	  leads	  to	  five	  broad	  types	  of	  guidelines,	  described	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  the	  





Figure	  5.	  Questions	  about	  human-­‐system	  interaction	  that	  lead	  to	  five	  types	  of	  guidelines.	  
	  
Pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  via	  the	  interface	  
	  
Certain	  guidelines	  provide	  descriptions	  of	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  the	  human	  operator	  should	  be	  able	  to	  
perform	  via	  the	  interface.	  For	  example,	  as	  a	  participant	  in	  the	  NAS,	  the	  remote	  pilot	  may	  be	  
required	  by	  ATC	  to	  direct	  the	  aircraft	  on	  to	  a	  magnetic	  heading.	  Therefore	  the	  RPS	  must	  provide	  
displays	  and	  controls	  to	  support	  this	  task.	  In	  general,	  a	  guideline	  that	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  task	  
statement	  is	  a	  form	  of	  performance-­‐based	  standard	  that	  describes	  the	  outcome	  without	  
defining	  how	  it	  will	  be	  achieved,	  although	  a	  desired	  level	  of	  accuracy	  or	  speed	  may	  be	  specified.	  	  




















What	  PIC	  tasks	  are	  (1)	  unique	  
to	  UAS	  or	  (2)	  will	  present	  
unique	  challenges	  for	  the	  PIC?	  
What	  information	  must	  the	  
GCS	  provide	  to	  the	  PIC	  to	  
enable	  task	  performance?	  
What	  inputs	  must	  the	  PIC	  
make	  via	  the	  GCS	  to	  perform	  
assigned	  tasks?	  
How	  should	  controls	  and	  
displays	  look,	  feel	  &	  sound?	  
How	  should	  they	  operate?	  
What	  broad	  or	  additional	  
principles	  apply	  across	  the	  
engineered	  system?	  
	  PIC	  tasks	  with	  specific	  
significance	  for	  UAS	  
Properties	  of	  the	  
interface	  
Control	  inputs	  
Information	  content	  of	  
displays	  
General-­‐level	  	  	  
guidelines	  
	   QUESTION	   	   	   	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  ANSWER	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design	  solutions,	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  remain	  relevant	  and	  “future-­‐proof,”	  even	  as	  technology	  
evolves.	  	  	  In	  this	  document,	  we	  focus	  on	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  are	  unique	  to	  RPAS	  operations,	  or	  tasks	  
that	  present	  significant	  additional	  challenges	  for	  remote	  pilot	  compared	  to	  the	  pilot	  of	  a	  
conventional	  aircraft.	  
	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  
	  
These	  guidelines	  deal	  with	  the	  information	  that	  the	  interface	  is	  expected	  to	  provide	  to	  the	  pilot	  
via	  displays.	  These	  guidelines	  do	  not	  specify	  the	  form	  that	  the	  information	  should	  take.	  For	  
example,	  it	  may	  be	  stated	  that	  the	  pilot	  should	  receive	  an	  alert	  if	  the	  control	  link	  is	  lost,	  without	  
specifying	  whether	  the	  alert	  should	  be	  communicated	  using	  auditory,	  visual,	  or	  haptic	  means,	  
or	  some	  combination	  of	  these	  modes.	  	  	  These	  guidelines	  will	  typically	  be	  expressed	  in	  general	  





These	  are	  inputs	  that	  the	  RPS	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  receiving	  from	  the	  pilot.	  The	  requirement	  may	  
specify	  key	  attributes	  of	  the	  input,	  such	  as	  timing	  and	  precision,	  but	  will	  remain	  agnostic	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  device	  used	  to	  make	  the	  input.	  
	  
Properties	  of	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
	  
The	  properties	  of	  the	  HMI	  include	  layout,	  shape,	  physical	  accessibility,	  visibility,	  the	  use	  of	  color	  
and	  the	  structure	  of	  specific	  computer	  interfaces.	  Despite	  a	  widespread	  use	  of	  electronic	  
displays,	  menu	  structures	  and	  point	  and	  click	  input	  devices,	  physical	  ergonomics	  are	  still	  
relevant	  for	  the	  design	  of	  remote	  pilot	  stations,	  as	  several	  analyses	  of	  RPS	  have	  identified	  issues	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such	  as	  controls	  that	  are	  out	  of	  reach	  of	  the	  pilot,	  or	  critical	  controls	  in	  locations	  where	  they	  




General	  design	  guidelines	  are	  “overarching”	  principles	  that	  have	  general	  applicability	  to	  the	  RPS	  
and	  relevance	  to	  multiple	  displays	  and	  controls.	  In	  most	  cases,	  these	  are	  agnostic	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  form	  of	  the	  HMI.	  Examples	  are	  general	  design	  principles	  dealing	  with	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  
internal	  consistency	  of	  the	  HMI,	  the	  need	  to	  manage	  data	  overload,	  and	  the	  avoidance	  of	  
competing	  alarms	  (Endsley	  &	  Jones,	  2012;	  Norman,	  1988;	  Shneiderman	  &	  Plaisant,	  2005).	  Some	  
general	  guidelines	  relate	  to	  the	  overall	  functioning	  of	  the	  RPS,	  including	  characteristics	  that	  
emerge	  from	  the	  operation	  of	  all	  sub-­‐systems	  together.	  For	  example,	  visual	  clutter,	  display	  
competition	  for	  attention	  and	  the	  prioritization	  of	  information.	  
	  
Remote	  pilot	  responsibilities	  
	  
Figure	  6	  presents	  a	  high-­‐level	  model	  of	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  remote	  pilot,	  consistent	  
with	  FAA	  assumptions,	  adapted	  from	  Mutuel,	  Wargo	  and	  DiFelici	  (2015).	  The	  model	  can	  act	  
as	  a	  “checklist”	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  areas	  of	  human-­‐system	  interaction	  are	  considered	  when	  
developing	  guidelines	  for	  the	  HMI.	  In	  some	  cases,	  broad	  areas	  of	  responsibility	  are	  common	  
to	  both	  conventional	  aviation	  and	  RPAS,	  yet	  may	  present	  special	  challenges	  for	  the	  remote	  
pilot.	  These	  include	  monitoring	  and	  controlling	  the	  status	  of	  radio	  links,	  control	  hand-­‐offs,	  
and	  flight	  termination.	  The	  model	  shown	  in	  figure	  6	  is	  used	  to	  organize	  the	  guidelines	  
contained	  in	  this	  document.	  Note	  that	  standards	  for	  Detect	  and	  Avoid	  (DAA)	  systems	  are	  
currently	  being	  developed	  by	  RTCA	  Special	  Committee	  228,	  therefore	  this	  document	  does	  
not	  include	  guidelines	  relating	  to	  collision	  avoidance	  maneuvers,	  or	  maneuvers	  to	  remain	  




 Figure 6. Responsibilities of the remote pilot  
	  
Manage:	  The	  “Manage”	  category	  includes	  the	  overall	  planning,	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  
management	  responsibilities	  that	  must	  be	  accomplished	  by	  the	  pilot,	  supported	  by	  the	  HMI.	  
For	  ease	  of	  presentation,	  management	  responsibilities	  are	  shown	  separately	  in	  Figure	  6,	  
although	  they	  overlap	  and	  cut-­‐across	  other	  responsibilities.	  	  	  	  
Aviate:	  These	  responsibilities	  include	  tactical,	  or	  short-­‐term,	  control	  of	  the	  air	  vehicle	  and	  its	  
ground-­‐based	  equipment,	  and	  the	  control	  link.	  	  In	  most	  cases,	  the	  continuous	  control	  functions	  
necessary	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  stable	  flight	  are	  allocated	  to	  on-­‐board	  automation,	  however	  
the	  pilot	  is	  still	  required	  to	  provide	  supervisory	  oversight	  and	  control	  the	  configuration	  of	  
systems.	  Maneuvers	  to	  avoid	  collisions	  with	  other	  aircraft	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  aspect	  of	  
“Aviate”,	  however	  as	  Minimum	  Operational	  Performance	  Standards	  (MOPS)	  for	  Detect	  and	  
Avoid	  (DAA)	  systems	  are	  currently	  being	  developed	  by	  RTCA	  Special	  Committee	  228,	  they	  will	  
not	  be	  covered	  in	  this	  document	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Navigate:	  The	  navigation	  responsibilities	  involve	  strategic,	  or	  longer-­‐term,	  control	  of	  the	  air	  
vehicle	  and	  its	  ground-­‐based	  equipment.	  Controlling	  and	  monitoring	  the	  location	  and	  flight	  
path	  of	  the	  aircraft	  includes	  ensuring	  that	  the	  aircraft	  navigates	  with	  respect	  to	  airspace	  
boundaries,	  terrain	  and	  other	  considerations.	  The	  “Remain	  well-­‐clear”	  responsibility	  must	  be	  
accomplished	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  out-­‐the-­‐window	  view,	  necessitating	  reliance	  on	  a	  traffic	  
situation	  display	  in	  the	  RPS.	  The	  two	  final	  responsibilities	  listed	  under	  “Navigate”	  are	  specific	  to	  
RPAS.	  The	  pilot	  must	  maintain	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  pre-­‐programmed	  lost	  link	  
maneuver,	  and	  ensure	  that	  the	  maneuver	  is	  updated	  as	  necessary	  as	  the	  flight	  progresses.	  
Finally,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  serious	  in-­‐flight	  anomaly,	  the	  pilot	  may	  be	  required	  to	  terminate	  the	  
flight,	  possibly	  by	  directing	  the	  aircraft	  to	  a	  suitable	  location	  for	  a	  controlled	  impact	  or	  ditching,	  
or	  by	  deploying	  a	  parachute	  system.	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  pilot	  must	  minimize	  risk	  to	  people	  and	  
property.	  	  
Communicate:	  The	  pilot	  in	  command	  must	  communicate	  with	  ATC,	  other	  airspace	  users,	  other	  
members	  of	  the	  flight	  crew	  or	  support	  team,	  and	  ancillary	  services	  such	  as	  weather	  briefers.	  
Communication	  and	  coordination	  within	  the	  RPAS	  operating	  team	  is	  critical	  and	  the	  HMI	  must	  
be	  designed	  to	  enable	  team	  situation	  awareness	  to	  be	  achieved.	  	  The	  relay	  of	  pilot-­‐ATC	  voice	  
communications	  via	  the	  RPA	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  introduce	  communication	  latencies	  that	  may	  
be	  sufficient	  to	  disrupt	  verbal	  communication.	  	  	  
 





This	  section	  contains	  two	  broad	  sets	  of	  preliminary	  human	  factors	  guidelines.	  	  Guidelines	  
contained	  in	  the	  first	  set	  refer	  to	  specific	  characteristics	  or	  capabilities	  of	  the	  HMI,	  and	  are	  
arranged	  using	  the	  model	  of	  pilot	  responsibilities	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6.	  	  The	  letter	  at	  the	  beginning	  
of	  each	  guideline	  code	  indicates	  the	  type	  of	  guideline.	  As	  shown	  in	  table	  3,	  guidelines	  with	  
codes	  beginning	  with	  “T_”	  specify	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  facilitated	  by	  the	  RPS.	  Guidelines	  
specifying	  the	  information	  content	  of	  displays	  have	  codes	  beginning	  with	  “I_”.	  Control	  input	  
guidelines	  have	  codes	  beginning	  with	  “C_”,	  and	  guidelines	  specifying	  properties	  of	  displays	  and	  
controls	  have	  “P_”	  codes.	  The	  second	  set	  of	  guidelines	  comprises	  considerations	  that	  have	  
general	  applicability	  to	  the	  RPS,	  possibly	  across	  multiple	  pilot	  responsibilities.	  These	  guidelines	  
are	  indicated	  by	  a	  “G_”	  code.	  General	  guidelines	  include	  human	  engineering	  activities	  that	  the	  
RPS	  developer	  is	  expected	  to	  accomplish	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  a	  RPS	  that	  can	  be	  operated	  safely	  
and	  reliably,	  considering	  human	  capabilities	  and	  limitations.	  	  	  
	  























T_	  RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  
human-­‐machine	  interface	  
	   	   	   	  
I_	  Information	  content	  of	  displays	   	   	   	   	  
C_	  Control	  inputs	   	   	   	   	  
P_	  	  Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	   	   	   	   	  
G_	  General	  guidelines	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Characteristics	  and	  capabilities	  of	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
Aviate 
	  
The	  goal	  of	  “Aviate”	  activities	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  basic	  functions	  of	  the	  aircraft	  operate	  
effectively.	  These	  responsibilities	  include	  tactical,	  or	  short-­‐term,	  control	  of	  the	  air	  vehicle,	  the	  
control	  link,	  and	  the	  control	  station.	  	  
Responsibility	  1.1:	  Monitor	  and	  control	  aircraft	  systems,	  including	  automation	  
In	  most	  cases,	  the	  continuous	  control	  functions	  necessary	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  stable	  
flight	  are	  allocated	  to	  on-­‐board	  automation,	  however	  the	  pilot	  is	  still	  required	  to	  provide	  
supervisory	  oversight	  and	  control	  the	  configuration	  of	  systems.	  This	  may	  include	  mode	  
selections	  for	  automated	  systems.	  The	  information	  necessary	  to	  perform	  these	  functions	  
will	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  telemetry	  (or	  downlink)	  element	  of	  the	  control	  link	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
T_1.1.1	  If	  an	  on-­‐board	  camera	  is	  used	  for	  flight	  control	  tasks,	  the	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  align	  the	  camera	  with	  the	  longitudinal	  access	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  	  




Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	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P_1.1.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  not	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  disengage	  automation	  in	  flight	  if	  the	  aircraft	  will	  depart	  from	  controlled	  flight	  as	  a	  result.	  	  P_1.1.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  prevent	  multiple	  operators	  from	  operating	  the	  same	  application	  or	  procedure	  at	  any	  one	  time.	  	  
(Adapted	  from	  NATO,	  2004)	  	  P_1.1.3	  It	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  set	  an	  RPS	  to	  a	  receive	  only	  mode,	  in	  which	  the	  RPS	  displays	  information	  downlinked	  from	  an	  RPA	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  active	  command	  link..	  	  
(Adapted	  from	  NATO,	  2004)	  
Related	  special	  considerations	  	  	  
A.	  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing;	  	   B.	  Control	  and	  communication	  via	  radio	  link	  	  
	  
	  
Responsibility	  1.2:	  Monitor	  consumable	  resources	  
Consumable	  resources	  on	  the	  RPA	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  reduce	  in	  quantity	  over	  the	  course	  of	  
a	  flight.	  Depending	  upon	  the	  design	  of	  the	  aircraft,	  these	  resources	  may	  include	  fuel,	  oil,	  
and	  battery	  power.	  The	  RPS	  must	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  status	  of	  these	  resources.	  	  
The	  task	  of	  monitoring	  consumable	  resources	  may	  involve	  aspects	  unique	  to	  RPAS,	  
including	  unconventional	  propulsion	  systems	  and	  long	  duration	  flights.	  Additionally,	  the	  
pilot	  must	  be	  prepared	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  lost	  link	  procedure	  may	  place	  additional	  
demands	  on	  consumable	  resources,	  and	  the	  pilot	  may	  be	  unable	  to	  intervene	  while	  the	  
aircraft	  is	  performing	  the	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  	  	  	  	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
T_1.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  status	  of	  consumable	  resources.	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  





Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	  
	  
Related	  special	  considerations	  
E.	  Unique	  flight	  characteristics	  of	  RPA	  	  
	  
	  
Responsibility	  1.3:	  Monitor	  and	  configure	  control	  station.	  
Management	  of	  the	  RPS	  will	  require	  the	  pilot	  or	  other	  crewmembers	  to	  monitor	  and	  
configure	  the	  status	  of	  the	  RPS,	  and	  identify	  and	  respond	  to	  abnormal	  conditions.	  	  This	  may	  
include	  managing	  the	  performance	  of	  computer	  systems	  and	  power	  supplies.	  Unique	  
considerations	  may	  include	  the	  need	  to	  manage	  uninterruptable	  power	  supplies	  and	  air	  
conditioning	  required	  for	  computer	  systems.	  If	  a	  second	  RPS	  is	  planned	  to	  be	  used	  during	  
the	  flight,	  or	  is	  available	  on	  standby,	  the	  pilot	  may	  also	  need	  to	  maintain	  an	  awareness	  of	  
the	  state	  of	  readiness	  of	  that	  RPS.	  	  	  	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
T_1.3.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  perform	  checks	  on	  the	  status	  of	  RPS	  systems.	  	  T_1.3.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  perform	  a	  pre-­‐flight	  check	  on	  an	  alternate	  control	  station,	  or	  confirm	  that	  this	  check	  has	  been	  performed.	  
(RTCA,	  2007)	  T_1.3.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  performance	  of	  RPS	  support	  services,	  e.g.	  air	  conditioning	  and	  electrical	  power.	  	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  
I_1.3.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  health	  and	  status	  information	  on	  the	  RPS.	  
Control	  inputs	  
	  




Related	  special	  considerations	  	  
C.	  Physical	  characteristics	  of	  the	  RPS	  	  	  
	  
Responsibility	  1.4:	  Maneuver	  to	  avoid	  collisions	  with	  other	  aircraft	  or	  terrain.	  
This	  responsibility	  refers	  to	  tactical	  maneuvers	  to	  avoid	  collisions	  with	  proximate	  aircraft	  or	  
objects.	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  Detect	  and	  Avoid	  (DAA)	  and	  will	  only	  be	  
necessary	  when	  the	  RPA	  has	  failed	  to	  remain	  well-­‐clear	  of	  other	  traffic.	  	  Guidelines	  for	  DAA	  
systems	  are	  currently	  being	  developed	  by	  RTCA	  Special	  Committee	  228	  (Unmanned	  Aircraft	  
Systems).	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Responsibility	  1.5:	  Monitor	  and	  control	  status	  of	  	  links	  
The	  control	  and	  communications	  (C2)	  link	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  RPAS.	  The	  link	  may	  
utilize	  a	  combination	  of	  technologies,	  including	  terrestrial	  radio	  (stand-­‐alone	  or	  networked),	  
satellite	  radio	  (geostationary	  or	  low	  earth	  orbit),	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  relays,	  and	  ground-­‐based	  
communication	  infrastructure.	  	  As	  well	  as	  managing	  the	  aircraft,	  the	  pilot	  of	  a	  RPA	  
operating	  in	  the	  NAS	  must	  maintain	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  C2	  link,	  and	  will	  
require	  the	  ability	  to	  manage	  the	  link.	  Link	  management	  will	  be	  particularly	  critical	  during	  
control	  handovers,	  lost	  link	  and	  link	  resumption,	  when	  operating	  towards	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  
signal,	  and	  during	  frequency	  changes.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “link”	  in	  the	  following	  guidelines	  
includes	  uplink	  and	  downlink.	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
T_1.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  confirm	  spectrum	  availability	  before	  selecting	  link.	  T_1.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  appropriate	  communication	  mode	  (e.g.	  terrestrial/satellite,	  frequency).	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T_1.5.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  selected	  communication	  mode.	  T_1.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  confirm	  that	  communication	  link	  is	  effective,	  and	  established	  with	  the	  correct	  UA.	  T_1.5.5	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  identify	  if	  more	  than	  one	  control	  station	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  UA.	  	  T_1.5.6	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  link	  strength,	  or	  link	  abnormalities.	  T_1.5.7	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  link	  latency,	  where	  relevant.	  T_1.5.8	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  anticipate	  link	  degradations	  or	  diminished	  link	  strength.	  T_1.5.9	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  geographic	  limits	  of	  the	  link	  and	  potential	  obstructions	  to	  signal.	  T_1.5.10	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  crew	  actions	  or	  control	  inputs	  that	  could	  interrupt	  or	  degrade	  the	  link.	  T_1.5.11	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  respond	  to	  interference	  with	  the	  signal,	  (e.g.	  other	  users	  of	  frequency,	  jamming	  attempts).	  T_1.5.12	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  change	  the	  link	  during	  flight	  operations	  as	  necessary.	  T_1.5.13	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  assess	  link	  strength	  and	  quality	  before	  switching	  link.	  T_1.5.14	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  define	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  loss	  of	  link	  that	  must	  occur	  before	  the	  lost	  link	  alert	  is	  activated,	  or	  the	  RPA	  enters	  its	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  T_1.5.15	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  manage	  resumption	  of	  the	  signal	  after	  a	  lost	  link.	  	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  
I_1.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  providing	  the	  pilot	  with	  predictive	  information	  on	  the	  quality	  and	  strength	  of	  a	  C2	  link	  before	  the	  link	  is	  actively	  used	  to	  control	  the	  UA.	  I_1.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  identify	  which	  C2	  link	  settings	  are	  active	  (e.g.	  selected	  frequency,	  satellite	  vs	  terrestrial).	  I_1.5.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  to	  confirm	  that	  effective	  control	  is	  established	  with	  the	  correct	  UA.	  	  I_1.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  the	  geographic	  limits	  of	  the	  link.	  I_1.5.5	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  spectrum	  activity	  from	  a	  spectrum	  
	  31	  
	  
analyzer.	  I_1.5.6	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  RPA	  is	  approaching	  an	  area	  where	  link	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  lost.	  I_1.5.7	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  link	  is	  lost.	  I_1.5.8	  The	  RPA	  will	  transmit	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  transponder	  code	  when	  the	  link	  is	  lost.	  I_1.5.9	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  link.	  I_1.5.10	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  whenever	  the	  C2	  link	  experiences	  interference,	  whether	  resulting	  from	  natural	  phenomena,	  payload	  or	  other	  equipment	  associated	  with	  the	  RPAS,	  or	  human	  activities	  (such	  as	  jamming	  or	  other	  users	  on	  frequency).	  I_1.5.11	  The	  RPS	  should	  display	  to	  the	  pilot	  the	  source	  of	  downlink	  transmissions.	  	  
(Access	  5,2006)	  I_1.5.12	  Where	  relevant,	  the	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  link	  latency,	  in	  milliseconds.	  I_1.5.13	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  anticipate	  link	  degradations	  or	  diminished	  link	  strength.	  This	  information	  may	  include	  link	  footprint,	  including	  areas	  that	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  terrain	  masking.	  I_1.5.14	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  manage	  link	  security.	  I_1.5.15	  The	  RPS	  should	  inform	  the	  pilot	  when	  a	  lost	  link	  is	  resumed.	  	  
Control	  inputs	  
C_1.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  communication	  mode	  (e.g.	  terrestrial/satellite,	  frequency,	  transmission	  power).	  C_1.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  control	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  request	  a	  link	  status	  report.	  C_1.5.3	  If	  antenna	  selection	  is	  performed	  by	  the	  pilot,	  then	  the	  RPS	  should	  support	  an	  external	  command	  to	  set	  the	  antenna	  used	  for	  communication.	  	  C_1.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  set	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  link	  outage	  that	  must	  occur	  before	  a	  lost	  link	  response	  is	  triggered.	  
Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	  
P_1.5.1	  “There	  must	  be	  an	  alert	  for	  the	  UAS	  [RPAS]	  crew,	  via	  a	  clear	  and	  distinct	  aural	  and	  visual	  signal,	  for	  any	  total	  loss	  of	  the	  command	  and	  control	  data	  link”.	  	  
(NATO,	  2009)	  P_1.5.2	  The	  aural	  warning	  for	  lost	  control	  link	  should	  be	  a	  unique	  sound,	  not	  also	  used	  to	  signify	  other	  conditions.	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P_1.5.3	  The	  maximum	  range	  of	  the	  C2	  datalink	  (datalink	  footprint)	  for	  all	  altitudes	  and	  directions	  relative	  to	  the	  signal	  source	  should	  be	  presented	  visually	  to	  the	  pilot,	  overlaid	  on	  a	  map	  display.	  P_1.5.4	  Areas	  where	  the	  C2	  link	  (datalink	  footprint)	  are	  predicted	  to	  be	  masked	  by	  terrain	  should	  be	  displayed	  on	  the	  C2	  datalink	  display.	  	  	  P_1.5.5	  If	  the	  datalink	  footprint	  can	  be	  suppressed,	  it	  should	  be	  automatically	  displayed	  when	  the	  RPA	  is	  approaching	  a	  location	  where	  a	  loss	  of	  link	  is	  likely.	  	  	  P_1.5.6	  The	  C2	  datalink	  footprint	  should	  be	  easily	  distinguishable	  from	  other	  footprints	  that	  may	  be	  present	  on	  the	  operator	  map	  display.	  	  
(NATO,	  2004).	  P_1.5.7	  If	  the	  payload	  utilizes	  a	  link	  separate	  to	  the	  aircraft	  control	  link,	  any	  display	  of	  payload	  link	  quality	  should	  be	  separate	  and	  clearly	  distinguishable	  from	  displays	  for	  the	  aircraft	  control	  link.	  P_1.5.8	  If	  an	  aural	  warning	  is	  used	  to	  indicate	  loss	  of	  payload	  link,	  the	  sound	  should	  be	  dissimilar	  to	  that	  used	  to	  indicate	  loss	  of	  control	  link.	  	  P_1.5.9	  Security	  features	  designed	  to	  prevent	  unapproved	  access	  (logon	  and	  logoff	  functions)	  should	  not	  result	  in	  inadvertent	  lockouts	  of	  authorized	  personnel.	  	  P_1.5.10	  The	  RPS,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  RPAS	  should	  comply	  with	  control	  link	  latency	  (time	  from	  initiation	  of	  a	  maneuver	  to	  a	  measurable	  response	  by	  the	  RPA)	  requirements	  that	  are	  established	  at	  a	  level	  similar	  to	  conventionally-­‐piloted	  aircraft.	  	  
(FAA,	  2013b)	  	  
	  
Related	  special	  considerations	  	  
B.	  Control	  and	  communication	  via	  radio	  link	  .	  
	  
	  
Responsibility	  1.6:	  Transfer	  control	  
The	  ability	  to	  completely	  transfer	  control	  between	  or	  within	  control	  stations	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
key	  differences	  between	  RPAS	  operations	  and	  conventional	  aviation.	  Handovers	  have	  been	  
identified	  as	  an	  area	  of	  increased	  risk	  in	  a	  range	  of	  industrial	  and	  transport	  settings,	  
including	  aircraft	  maintenance,	  medicine,	  and	  air	  traffic	  control.	  Handovers	  require	  special	  
attention	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  crew	  of	  the	  “receiving”	  and	  “giving”	  RPS	  possess	  a	  shared	  
understanding	  of	  the	  operational	  situation	  and	  that	  control	  settings	  are	  aligned	  between	  
the	  two	  control	  stations.	  	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	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T_1.6.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  control	  to	  be	  transferred	  between	  a	  giving	  and	  receiving	  RPS	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  seamless	  and	  transparent	  to	  ATC.	  	  
(FAA,	  2013b)	  	  T_1.6.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  continuity	  of	  pilot	  function	  to	  be	  maintained	  during	  the	  transfer	  of	  control	  between	  a	  giving	  and	  receiving	  RPS.	  	  
(FAA,	  2013b)	  	  T_1.6.3	  “The	  RPS	  shall	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  ensure	  that	  operating	  parameters	  are	  identical	  before	  and	  after	  handover”.	  	  
(NATO,	  2009)	  T_1.6..4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  pass	  RPA	  control	  (handover)	  to	  another	  RPS	  and	  monitor	  the	  status	  of	  the	  handover.	  	  
(NATO,	  2004)	  T_1.6.5	  In	  cases	  where	  more	  than	  one	  	  RPS	  could	  be	  linked	  with	  the	  RPA,	  each	  RPS	  will	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  which	  entity	  has	  control	  of	  the	  aircraft	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  entity	  has	  control.	  	  
(Apapted	  from	  Access	  5,	  2006)	  T_1.6.6	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots	  to	  confirm	  that	  control	  settings	  are	  appropriate	  and	  consistent	  before	  a	  handover	  is	  accomplished.	  T_1.6.7	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  receiving	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  status	  of	  the	  RPA	  by	  receiving	  telemetry	  from	  the	  RPA	  before	  establishing	  control	  of	  the	  UA.	  	  	  T_1.6.8	  The	  RPS	  should	  facilitate	  a	  handover	  briefing	  between	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots.	  T_1.6.9	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  receiving	  pilot	  with	  a	  means	  of	  confirming	  that	  control	  has	  been	  established	  with	  the	  UA.	  	  	  	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  
I_1.6.1	  The	  pilot	  should	  be	  presented	  with	  information	  necessary	  to	  confirm	  that	  flight-­‐critical	  settings	  in	  the	  receiving	  RPS	  are	  consistent	  with	  settings	  in	  the	  giving	  RPS.	  	  	  I_1.6.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  level	  of	  involvement	  indicator	  to	  the	  pilot	  to	  show	  whether	  the	  RPS	  has	  been	  set	  to	  only	  receive	  telemetry	  from	  the	  UA,	  or	  to	  receive	  telemetry	  and	  transmit	  commands	  to	  the	  UA.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Control	  inputs	  
C_1.6.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  desired	  level	  of	  involvement	  with	  a	  UA,	  ranging	  from	  monitoring	  telemetry	  without	  an	  active	  uplink,	  to	  telemetry	  with	  full	  control	  via	  an	  active	  uplink.	  	  	  	  	  C_1.6.2	  There	  should	  be	  a	  means	  for	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots	  to	  communicate	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  the	  handover.	  
Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	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P_1.6.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  suitable	  displays	  to	  enable	  briefings	  to	  be	  conducted	  between	  a	  seated	  pilot	  and	  a	  standing	  pilot	  during	  control	  handovers.	  	  This	  may	  include	  the	  use	  of	  large	  scale	  synoptic	  displays.	  P_1.6.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  control	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  another	  RPS	  without	  any	  gap	  in	  control	  occurring	  during	  the	  handover.	  
Related	  special	  considerations	  





The	  navigate	  responsibility	  involves	  largely	  strategic,	  or	  longer-­‐term,	  control	  of	  the	  RPA..	  In	  
many	  cases,	  the	  task	  of	  navigating	  the	  RPA	  is	  substantially	  the	  same	  as	  that	  for	  a	  
conventionally-­‐piloted	  aircraft.	  This	  section	  does	  not	  include	  requirements	  or	  guidelines	  that	  
would	  apply	  equally	  to	  conventionally-­‐piloted	  aircraft.	  
Responsibility	  2.1:	  Control	  and	  monitor	  location	  and	  flight	  path	  of	  aircraft.	  
Controlling	  and	  monitoring	  the	  location	  and	  flight	  path	  of	  the	  aircraft	  includes	  ensuring	  that	  
the	  aircraft	  keeps	  to	  its	  flight	  plan,	  taking	  into	  account	  airspace	  boundaries,	  terrain	  and	  
other	  considerations.	  This	  responsibility	  includes	  ground	  taxiing	  and	  complying	  with	  all	  
requirements	  for	  navigating	  airport	  taxiways	  and	  runways.	  	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
	  T_2.1.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  ensure	  that	  both	  the	  runway	  and	  approach	  path	  are	  clear	  of	  traffic	  before	  taxiing	  onto	  the	  active	  runway.	  	  
(FAA,	  2013b)	  T_2.1.2	  “The	  UAS	  [RPAS]	  shall	  be	  capable	  of	  transitioning	  from	  an	  instrument	  approach	  procedure	  to	  a	  safe	  landing,	  either	  by	  visual	  reference	  of	  a	  flight	  crewmember	  at	  the	  airport	  or	  by	  other	  means	  acceptable	  to	  the	  FAA”.	  	  
(FAA,	  2013b)	  	  







Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	  
P_2.1.1	  Map	  displays	  should	  be	  able	  to	  support	  a	  variety	  of	  map	  types	  including	  aeronautical	  charts	  and	  presentations	  of	  Digital	  Terrain	  Elevation	  Data	  (DTED).	  P_2.1.2	  Map	  displays	  should	  be	  configurable	  to	  “North	  up”	  or	  “Track	  up”.	  	  P_2.1.3	  If	  control	  is	  via	  a	  terrestrial	  radio,	  the	  location	  of	  (or	  direction	  to)	  the	  ground	  transmitter/receiver	  should	  be	  shown	  on	  the	  map.	  	  
	  P_2.1.4	  Primary	  flight	  controls	  for	  controlling	  the	  RPA	  (heading,	  attitude,	  speed)	  should	  be	  available	  at	  all	  times	  through	  dedicated	  physical	  controls.	  	  If	  the	  use	  of	  software-­‐based	  controls	  cannot	  be	  avoided,	  then	  the	  controls	  should	  be	  immediately	  accessible	  at	  the	  top	  level	  of	  the	  control	  interface.	  	  
(NATO,	  	  2009).	  
	  
Related	  special	  considerations	  
A.	  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing;	  C.	  Control	  station	  on	  ground;	  G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation.	  
	  
	  
Responsibility	  2.2:	  Remain	  clear	  of	  terrain,	  airspace	  boundaries	  and	  weather	  
This	  responsibility	  covers	  the	  activities	  involved	  in	  remaining	  clear	  of	  undesired	  locations	  
that	  can	  be	  identified	  during	  flight	  planning	  or	  may	  become	  apparent	  during	  the	  course	  of	  a	  
flight.	  These	  locations	  may	  be	  undesired	  due	  to	  terrain,	  airspace	  boundaries,	  weather,	  or	  
other	  operational	  restrictions.	  	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
T_2.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  “observe”	  and	  comply	  with	  signage,	  painted	  markings,	  and	  warning	  lights	  during	  surface	  operations.	  	  
(FAA,	  2013b)	  	  T_2.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  weather	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  the	  flight.	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(RTCA,	  2007)	  T_2.2.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  avoid	  weather	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  the	  flight.	  	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  
Display	  Airspace	  Coordination	  Information	  I_2.2.1	  “The	  operator	  should	  be	  able	  to	  display	  flight	  corridors,	  controlled	  airspace	  and	  any	  other	  relevant	  airspace	  co-­‐ordination	  information”.	  	  
(NATO,	  2004)	  I_2.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  display	  weather	  information	  to	  the	  pilot.	  I_2.2.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  the	  location	  of	  icing	  conditions.	  I_2.2.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  RPA	  enters	  icing	  conditions.	  I_2.2.5	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  RPA	  encounters	  significant	  air	  turbulence.	  	  	  
    
Control	  inputs	  
	  
Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	  
	  
Related	  special	  considerations	  
A.	  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing;	  E.	  Unique	  characteristics	  of	  RPA	  flight.	  	  
	  
Responsibility	  2.3:	  Remain	  well-­‐clear	  of	  other	  aircraft	  
This	  responsibility	  includes	  the	  strategic	  separation	  assurance	  function	  of	  Detect	  and	  Avoid	  
(DAA),	  in	  which	  the	  RPA	  remains	  well	  clear	  of	  other	  traffic.	  Guidelines	  for	  DAA	  systems	  are	  
currently	  being	  developed	  by	  RTCA	  Special	  Committee	  228	  (Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems).	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Responsibility	  2.4:	  	  Review	  and	  refresh	  lost	  link	  mission	  as	  necessary.	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The	  pilot	  must	  maintain	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  pre-­‐programmed	  lost	  link	  maneuver,	  
and	  ensure	  that	  the	  maneuver	  is	  updated	  as	  necessary	  as	  the	  flight	  progresses.	  If	  the	  lost	  
link	  procedure	  becomes	  “stale”,	  the	  aircraft	  may	  execute	  an	  unsafe	  maneuver	  in	  the	  event	  
of	  a	  lost	  link,	  such	  as	  flying	  towards	  terrain	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  reach	  a	  waypoint	  programmed	  
earlier	  in	  the	  flight.	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
T_2.4.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  remain	  aware	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure	  as	  the	  flight	  progresses.	  T_2.4.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  update	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure	  as	  the	  flight	  progresses.	  T_2.4.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  must	  elapse	  between	  the	  onset	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  event	  and	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  	  	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  
I_2.4.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  a	  display	  indicating	  the	  future	  flightpath	  of	  the	  aircraft	  should	  a	  lost	  link	  occur.	  	  	  I_2.4.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  whenever	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  procedure	  would	  create	  a	  hazard	  (such	  as	  directing	  the	  aircraft	  towards	  terrain,	  or	  into	  non-­‐authorized	  airspace).	  
	  I_2.4.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  display	  to	  the	  pilot	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  will	  elapse	  between	  the	  onset	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  event	  and	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  	  	  
	  I_2.4.4	  In	  the	  event	  of	  a	  lost	  link,	  the	  RPS	  should	  display	  the	  time	  remaining	  until	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  
Control	  inputs	  
	  
Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	  
P_2.4.1	  The	  flightpath	  that	  would	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  aircraft	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  should	  be	  clearly	  distinguishable	  from	  the	  programmed	  normal	  flightpath	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  	  	  	  P_2.4.2	  Information	  on	  the	  programmed	  lost	  link	  behavior	  of	  the	  aircraft	  should	  be	  readily	  available	  to	  the	  pilot,	  without	  the	  need	  for	  complex	  interactions	  with	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface.	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Related	  special	  considerations	  
B.	  Control	  and	  communication	  via	  radio	  link	  
	  
	  
Responsibility	  2.5:	  Terminate	  flight	  
In	  an	  emergency,	  the	  remote	  pilot	  may	  be	  required	  to	  terminate	  the	  flight	  by	  a	  controlled	  
impact,	  ditching,	  parachute	  deployment,	  or	  other	  method.	  Human	  factors	  considerations	  
will	  include	  the	  information	  pilots	  will	  require	  to	  make	  this	  difficult	  decision	  and	  execute	  
the	  action,	  as	  well	  as	  measures	  to	  protect	  against	  the	  inadvertent	  activation	  of	  the	  flight	  
termination	  system.	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
T_2.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  decide	  when	  to	  terminate	  the	  flight	  via	  controlled	  impact,	  ditching	  or	  parachute	  descent.	  T_2.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  identify	  a	  suitable	  location	  for	  flight	  termination.	  T_2.5.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  terminate	  the	  flight	  in	  a	  pre-­‐designated	  area.	  
(RTCA,	  2007)	  T_2.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  use	  real-­‐time	  information	  to	  confirm	  that	  flight	  termination	  at	  the	  selected	  location	  will	  not	  present	  unacceptable	  risk	  to	  people	  or	  property.	  	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  
I_2.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  real-­‐time	  imagery	  of	  the	  selected	  impact,	  ditching	  or	  parachute	  descent	  site	  to	  confirm	  that	  a	  safe	  termination	  can	  be	  accomplished.	  I_2.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  an	  alert	  to	  the	  pilot	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  flight	  termination	  system	  is	  about	  to	  be	  activated.	  	  
Control	  inputs	  
	  
Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	  
P_2.5.1	  When	  the	  RPA	  is	  equipped	  with	  a	  flight	  termination	  system:	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P_2.5.1a.	  The	  use	  of	  these	  controls	  should	  be	  intuitive	  and	  minimize	  the	  possibility	  of	  confusion	  and	  subsequent	  inadvertent	  operation.	  
P_2.5.1b.	  Two	  distinct	  and	  dissimilar	  actions	  of	  the	  RPAS	  crew	  should	  be	  required	  to	  initiate	  the	  flight	  termination	  command.	  	  
(NATO,	  2009)	  
	  
Note:	  STANAG	  4671	  (NATO,	  2009	  	  specifies	  that	  flight	  termination	  controls	  “must	  be	  arranged	  and	  
identified	  such	  that	  they	  are	  readily	  available	  and	  accessible”.	  This	  text	  has	  been	  deleted	  from	  this	  
document	  as	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  flight	  termination	  controls	  should	  not	  be	  readily	  accessible.	  STANAG	  
4671	  did	  not	  contain	  requirement	  for	  dissimilar	  controls.	  This	  requirement	  is	  based	  on	  the	  experience	  
contained	  in	  NASA	  procedural	  requirements	  related	  to	  two-­‐fault	  tolerance).	  P_2.5.2	  Before	  the	  final	  step	  in	  activating	  the	  flight	  termination	  system	  is	  reached,	  the	  RPS	  should	  provide	  an	  aural	  and	  visual	  alert	  to	  the	  pilot	  that	  flight	  termination	  is	  about	  to	  be	  activated.	  P_2.5.3	  The	  aural	  alert	  warning	  of	  imminent	  flight	  termination	  should	  involve	  a	  unique	  sound.	  This	  should	  preferably	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  verbal	  message	  such	  as	  “Flight	  termination!”	  P_2.5.4	  When	  the	  RPA	  is	  equipped	  with	  a	  flight	  termination	  system,	  flight	  termination	  controls	  should	  be	  safeguarded	  from	  interference	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  inadvertent	  operation.	  	  
(NATO,	  2009).	  
	  
Related	  special	  considerations	  




The	  Pilot	  in	  command	  must	  communicate	  with	  ATC,	  other	  airspace	  users,	  other	  members	  of	  the	  
flight	  crew	  or	  support	  team,	  and	  ancillary	  services	  such	  as	  weather	  briefers.	  
Responsibilities	  3.1	  &	  3.2	  :	  Communicate	  with	  ATC	  and	  other	  airspace	  users	  
Communication	  with	  ATC	  is	  typically	  via	  VHF	  voice	  communications	  transmitted	  from	  the	  
UA,	  or	  in	  some	  cases,	  controller	  pilot	  data	  link	  (CPDL).	  	  If	  the	  RPA	  is	  operating	  beyond	  radio	  
line-­‐of-­‐sight	  of	  the	  ground	  transmitter,	  communications	  may	  be	  relayed	  using	  ground	  
infrastructure	  or	  satellite.	  Additionally,	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  relays	  between	  RPA	  may	  be	  used	  in	  some	  
cases.	  Relays	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  introduce	  time	  delays	  into	  communications.	  	  In	  addition	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to	  communicating	  with	  ATC,	  the	  pilot	  may	  be	  required	  to	  communicate	  with	  other	  airspace	  
users.	  This	  includes	  direct	  pilot-­‐to-­‐pilot	  communications	  as	  well	  as	  “party	  line”	  
communications	  that	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  the	  location	  and	  intentions	  of	  
other	  users	  of	  the	  airspace.	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
T_3.1.1	  When	  operating	  near	  a	  non-­‐towered	  airport,	  the	  pilot	  should	  be	  able	  to	  exchange	  intent	  information	  with	  other	  airport	  traffic	  through	  standard	  communications	  on	  the	  airport	  common	  traffic	  advisory	  frequency	  (CTAF).	  	  
(FAA,	  2013b)	  	  T_3.1.2	  The	  remote	  pilot	  should	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  an	  alternate	  communications	  method	  with	  ATC	  if	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  communications	  loss	  exceeds	  requirements	  for	  the	  operating	  environment.	  	  
(FAA,	  2013b)	  	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  




Properties	  of	  displays	  and	  controls	  
P_3.1.1	  The	  voice	  communication	  delay	  between	  the	  pilot	  and	  ATC	  should	  have	  a	  mean	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  250	  ms.	  	  
(FAA,	  2012)	  P_3.1.2	  The	  voice	  communication	  delay	  between	  the	  pilot	  and	  ATC	  should	  be	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  300	  ms.	  (99th	  percentile).	  	  
(FAA,	  2012)	  P_3.1.3	  The	  voice	  communication	  delay	  between	  the	  pilot	  and	  ATC	  should	  be	  within	  a	  maximum	  of	  350	  ms.	  	  
(FAA,	  2012)	  
Related	  special	  considerations	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B.	  Control	  and	  communication	  via	  radio	  link.	  
	  
	  
Responsibility	  3.3:	  Communicate	  with	  other	  RPAS	  flight	  crew	  and	  ground	  support	  
personnel	  
Ground	  support	  personnel,	  external	  observers	  and	  other	  support	  personnel	  may	  be	  located	  
remote	  from	  the	  RPS.	  Communication	  and	  coordination	  within	  the	  operating	  team	  will	  
require	  special	  attention,	  and	  the	  human	  machine-­‐interface	  must	  be	  designed	  to	  enable	  
team	  situation	  awareness	  to	  be	  achieved.	  Some	  current	  RPAS	  operators	  use	  closed	  circuit	  
TV	  cameras	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  aircraft	  during	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐flight	  ground	  
handling.	  Where	  control	  of	  the	  RPA	  will	  be	  transferred	  in	  flight,	  communication	  must	  occur	  
between	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots.	  This	  may	  involve	  voice,	  or	  text	  based	  
communications.	  	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  
T_3.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  RPAS	  crewmembers	  to	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  (co-­‐located	  or	  not)	  in	  order	  to	  perform	  the	  necessary	  flight	  tasks.	  
(FAA,	  2013b)	  	  T_3.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  ensure	  that	  commands	  sent	  to	  the	  aircraft	  on	  the	  ground	  do	  not	  create	  a	  safety	  hazard	  for	  ground	  support	  personnel.	  	  	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays	  	  
I_3.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  imagery	  of	  the	  aircraft	  whenever	  the	  pilot	  has	  control	  of	  the	  aircraft	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  ground	  support	  personnel	  are	  interacting	  with	  the	  aircraft.	  	  	  	  I_3.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  a	  communication	  link	  with	  ground	  support	  personnel	  while	  they	  are	  interacting	  with	  the	  aircraft.	  	  	  	  
Control	  inputs	  
	  




Related	  special	  considerations	  
A.	  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing;	  	  B.	  Control	  and	  communication	  via	  radio	  link;	  C.	  Physical	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  control	  station	  	  
	  
	  
Responsibility	  	  3.4:	  Communicate	  with	  ancillary	  services	  
Ancillary	  services	  include	  weather	  briefers,	  and	  other	  personnel	  providing	  external	  support	  
to	  the	  RPAS	  operation.	  
RPAS-­‐specific	  pilot	  tasks	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  using	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  





The	  guidelines	  listed	  in	  this	  section	  are	  broad	  principles	  that	  have	  general	  applicability	  to	  the	  
RPS.	  	  Even	  though	  they	  may	  appear	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  human	  factors	  literature,	  these	  guidelines	  
are	  listed	  here	  because	  they	  have	  special	  relevance	  to	  RPAS	  in	  light	  of	  the	  human	  factors	  
considerations	  listed	  in	  Table	  2.	  	  	  
G_1	  RPAS	  developers	  should	  follow	  recognized	  human-­‐centered	  design	  processes	  including	  the	  following:	  G_1a.	  Develop	  a	  full	  set	  of	  pilot	  tasks	  and	  intended	  operations	  for	  which	  the	  RPS	  will	  be	  used.	  	  These	  will	  help	  drive	  ensuring	  a	  thorough	  design	  that	  provides	  all	  systems,	  information,	  and	  controls	  that	  the	  pilots	  will	  need.	  G_1b.	  Develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  potential	  safety	  critical	  errors	  that	  the	  pilots	  may	  make	  when	  accomplishing	  their	  tasks.	  	  These	  will	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  making	  trade-­‐offs	  in	  design	  decisions	  by	  focusing	  on	  design	  attributes	  that	  will	  mitigate	  critical	  errors	  as	  needed.	  G_1c.	  Develop	  a	  full	  set	  of	  information	  requirements	  for	  the	  tasks	  the	  pilots	  will	  need	  to	  
	  43	  
	  
accomplish.	  	  These	  requirements	  should	  be	  developed	  with	  other	  design	  requirements	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  systems	  engineering	  process.	  	  They	  will	  help	  ensure	  that	  the	  appropriate	  information	  is	  provided	  to	  the	  pilots	  and	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  making	  design	  decisions.	  G_1d.	  Develop	  a	  full	  set	  of	  requirements	  for	  controls	  that	  the	  pilot	  will	  need	  to	  accomplish	  their	  tasks.	  	  These	  requirements	  should	  be	  developed	  with	  other	  design	  requirements	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  systems	  engineering	  process.	  	  They	  will	  help	  ensure	  that	  all	  the	  pilot	  controls	  are	  planned	  for	  as	  design	  decisions	  are	  made.	  G_1e.	  Document	  all	  of	  the	  results	  of	  these	  processes	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  continually	  updated	  when	  design	  decisions	  and	  trade-­‐offs	  are	  made	  during	  the	  design	  process.	  	  Good	  documentation	  will	  also	  help	  the	  human	  factors	  design	  processes	  to	  be	  integrated	  with	  the	  other	  systems	  engineering	  development	  and	  design	  processes.	  
Supporting	  notes:	  Many	  safety	  studies	  have	  concluded	  that	  design-­‐related	  issues	  that	  lead	  to	  
accidents	  or	  incidents	  were	  the	  result	  of	  inadequate	  attention	  to	  developing	  and	  documenting	  
sound	  design	  requirements,	  not	  poor	  decisions	  about	  design	  characteristics.	  	  Following	  the	  
processes	  presented	  in	  this	  guideline	  will	  help	  provide	  a	  foundation	  to	  ensure	  that	  human	  
factors-­‐related	  requirements	  are	  developed	  and	  documented	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  good	  human	  factors	  
design	  decisions.	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  General	  
	  
	  
G_2	  The	  use	  of	  multi-­‐mode	  functions	  on	  flight	  controls	  should	  be	  minimized.	  If	  modes	  are	  used,	  the	  system	  should	  clearly	  indicate	  the	  current	  mode,	  and	  other	  potential	  modes	  should	  be	  indicated.	  
Supporting	  notes:	  Flight-­‐critical	  controls	  that	  can	  perform	  different	  functions	  based	  on	  mode	  
selection	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  provoke	  control	  errors.	  In	  some	  RPS	  for	  example,	  a	  sidestick	  
controller	  will	  control	  either	  pitch	  or	  speed,	  depending	  on	  the	  selected	  mode.	  Evidence	  from	  
conventional	  aviation	  indicates	  that	  maintaining	  mode	  awareness	  can	  be	  difficult	  for	  pilots	  
under	  some	  circumstances,	  and	  the	  resulting	  mode	  confusion	  can	  lead	  to	  accidents.	  	  	  	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation;	  H.	  Widespread	  use	  of	  interfaces	  




G_3	  If	  changing	  a	  mode	  selection	  of	  an	  automated	  system	  has	  a	  safety	  consequence,	  the	  action	  to	  select	  that	  mode	  should	  be	  alerted,	  and	  additional	  precautions	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  prevent	  inadvertent	  selection.	  	  
Supporting	  notes:	  Flight-­‐critical	  controls	  that	  can	  perform	  different	  functions	  based	  on	  mode	  
selection	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  provoke	  control	  errors.	  There	  have	  been	  cases	  where	  the	  
remote	  pilot	  has	  selected	  a	  mode	  in	  flight	  that	  renders	  the	  aircraft	  uncontrollable.	  The	  RPS	  
design	  should	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  perform	  such	  a	  mode	  selection	  action.	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation;	  H.	  Widespread	  use	  of	  interfaces	  
based	  on	  consumer	  products.	  
	  
	  
G_4	  Payload	  controls	  should	  be	  separate	  from	  controls	  with	  safety-­‐of-­‐flight	  functions.	  
Supporting	  notes:	  Some	  RPS	  designs	  have	  involved	  multi-­‐function	  controls	  that	  can	  be	  
configured	  to	  either	  control	  a	  safety-­‐of-­‐flight	  function	  or	  a	  non-­‐critical	  payload	  function.	  A	  
notable	  example	  was	  the	  accident	  to	  a	  MQ-­‐9	  in	  which	  the	  engine	  of	  the	  aircraft	  was	  shut	  down	  
inadvertently.	  Although	  the	  accident	  was	  related	  to	  multiple	  causal	  factors,	  one	  issue	  was	  that	  
a	  single	  lever	  in	  the	  RPS	  could	  be	  configured	  to	  either	  control	  an	  engine	  setting	  or	  control	  an	  iris	  
setting	  on	  a	  camera	  (NTSB,	  2006).	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  General	  
	  
	  
G_5	  It	  should	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  reconfigure	  a	  safety-­‐of-­‐flight	  control	  to	  perform	  a	  payload	  function.	  	  
Supporting	  notes:	  Some	  RPS	  designs	  have	  involved	  multi-­‐function	  controls	  that	  can	  be	  
configured	  to	  either	  control	  a	  safety-­‐of-­‐flight	  function	  or	  a	  non-­‐critical	  payload	  function.	  The	  
widespread	  use	  of	  consumer	  software	  in	  RPS	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  rapidly	  re-­‐configure	  controls	  to	  
perform	  functions	  that	  were	  not	  intended	  by	  the	  original	  designers.	  	  




G_6	  Activation	  of	  a	  key	  or	  button	  should	  provide	  tactile	  or	  auditory	  feedback	  to	  the	  pilot.	  
(ANSI/HFES,	  2007)	  	  
	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation;	  H.	  Widespread	  use	  of	  interfaces	  
based	  on	  consumer	  products.	  
	  
	  
G_7	  There	  should	  be	  a	  clear	  indication	  to	  the	  pilot	  when	  a	  command	  has	  been	  received	  by	  the	  RPA.	  	  
Supporting	  notes:	  The	  location	  of	  the	  RPAS	  pilot,	  remote	  from	  the	  aircraft,	  can	  make	  it	  
challenging	  for	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  an	  awareness	  of	  system	  state	  and	  behavior	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  other	  sensory	  cues,	  it	  is	  particularly	  important	  that	  the	  pilot	  receive	  feedback	  
that	  a	  command	  has	  been	  received	  and	  is	  being	  acted	  upon.	  	  	  	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  A.	  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing;	  B.	  Control	  and	  Communication	  via	  




G_8	  Any	  unrecognized	  entry	  made	  by	  the	  pilot	  at	  the	  RPS	  should	  cause	  an	  informative	  error	  message	  to	  be	  displayed	  and	  not	  affect	  the	  status	  or	  operation	  of	  any	  system.	  	  
(Access	  5,	  2006)	  	  
Supporting	  notes:	  The	  rich	  sensory	  cues	  available	  to	  the	  pilot	  of	  a	  conventional	  aircraft	  include	  
visual,	  auditory,	  proprioceptive	  and	  olfactory	  sensations.	  The	  absence	  of	  these	  cues	  when	  
operating	  a	  RPAS	  can	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  
aircraft’s	  state.	  Observations	  of	  airline	  pilots	  have	  indicated	  that	  “pilot	  error”	  is	  a	  relatively	  
frequent	  event,	  yet	  most	  of	  these	  errors	  are	  rapidly	  identified	  and	  corrected	  by	  the	  crews	  
themselves	  (ICAO,	  2002).	  The	  location	  of	  the	  RPAS	  pilot	  remote	  from	  the	  aircraft	  may	  make	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pilot	  error	  self-­‐correction	  more	  difficult.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  A.	  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing;	  B.	  Control	  and	  Communication	  via	  




G_9	  Flightcrew	  alerting.	  (Quoted	  verbatim	  from	  CFR	  §	  25.1322)	  G_9	  “(a)	  Flightcrew	  alerts	  must:	  (1)	  Provide	  the	  flightcrew	  with	  the	  information	  needed	  to:	  (i)	  Identify	  non-­‐normal	  operation	  or	  airplane	  system	  conditions,	  and	  (ii)	  Determine	  the	  appropriate	  actions,	  if	  any.	  (2)	  Be	  readily	  and	  easily	  detectable	  and	  intelligible	  by	  the	  flightcrew	  under	  all	  foreseeable	  operating	  conditions,	  including	  conditions	  where	  multiple	  alerts	  are	  provided.	  (3)	  Be	  removed	  when	  the	  alerting	  condition	  no	  longer	  exists.	  G_9	  (b)	  Alerts	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  following	  prioritization	  hierarchy	  based	  on	  the	  urgency	  of	  flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  response.	  (1)	  Warning:	  For	  conditions	  that	  require	  immediate	  flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  immediate	  flightcrew	  response.	  (2)	  Caution:	  For	  conditions	  that	  require	  immediate	  flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  subsequent	  flightcrew	  response.	  (3)	  Advisory:	  For	  conditions	  that	  require	  flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  may	  require	  subsequent	  flightcrew	  response.	  G_9	  (c)	  Warning	  and	  caution	  alerts	  must:	  (1)	  Be	  prioritized	  within	  each	  category,	  when	  necessary.	  (2)	  Provide	  timely	  attention-­‐getting	  cues	  through	  at	  least	  two	  different	  senses	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  aural,	  visual,	  or	  tactile	  indications.	  (3)	  Permit	  each	  occurrence	  of	  the	  attention-­‐getting	  cues	  required	  by	  paragraph	  (c)(2)	  of	  this	  section	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  and	  suppressed,	  unless	  they	  are	  required	  to	  be	  continuous.	  G_9	  (d)	  The	  alert	  function	  must	  be	  designed	  to	  minimize	  the	  effects	  of	  false	  and	  nuisance	  alerts.	  In	  particular,	  it	  must	  be	  designed	  to:	  (1)	  Prevent	  the	  presentation	  of	  an	  alert	  that	  is	  inappropriate	  or	  unnecessary.	  (2)	  Provide	  a	  means	  to	  suppress	  an	  attention-­‐getting	  component	  of	  an	  alert	  caused	  by	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  alerting	  function	  that	  interferes	  with	  the	  flightcrew's	  ability	  to	  safely	  operate	  the	  airplane.	  This	  means	  must	  not	  be	  readily	  available	  to	  the	  flightcrew	  so	  that	  it	  could	  be	  operated	  inadvertently	  or	  by	  habitual	  reflexive	  action.	  When	  an	  alert	  is	  suppressed,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  clear	  and	  unmistakable	  annunciation	  to	  the	  flightcrew	  that	  the	  alert	  has	  been	  suppressed.	  G_9	  (e)	  Visual	  alert	  indications	  must:	  (1)	  Conform	  to	  the	  following	  color	  convention:(i)	  Red	  for	  warning	  alert	  indications.	  (ii)	  Amber	  or	  yellow	  for	  caution	  alert	  indications.	  (iii)	  Any	  color	  except	  red	  or	  green	  for	  advisory	  alert	  indications.	  (2)	  Use	  visual	  coding	  techniques,	  together	  with	  other	  alerting	  function	  elements	  on	  the	  flight	  deck,	  to	  distinguish	  between	  warning,	  caution,	  and	  advisory	  alert	  indications,	  if	  they	  are	  presented	  on	  monochromatic	  displays	  that	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  conforming	  to	  the	  color	  convention	  in	  paragraph	  (e)(1)	  of	  this	  section.	  
G_9	  (f)	  Use	  of	  the	  colors	  red,	  amber,	  and	  yellow	  on	  the	  flight	  deck	  for	  functions	  other	  than	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flightcrew	  alerting	  must	  be	  limited	  and	  must	  not	  adversely	  affect	  flightcrew	  alerting”.	  	  
o Supporting	  notes:	  The	  presentation	  of	  warnings,	  cautions	  and	  advisories	  is	  an	  area	  where	  
current	  RPS	  designs	  have	  been	  particularly	  deficient.	  Designs	  have	  tended	  to	  present	  
information	  in	  textual	  format,	  which	  requires	  the	  pilot	  to	  receive	  the	  information	  through	  the	  
limited	  channel	  of	  foveal	  vision.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  direct	  on-­‐board	  experience	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  
performance,	  the	  remote	  pilot	  is	  entirely	  reliant	  on	  warning,	  caution	  and	  advisory	  alerts	  for	  
critical	  information	  on	  system	  status.	  
o 	  The	  above	  requirements	  are	  quoted	  directly	  from	  CFR	  part	  25	  due	  to	  their	  particular	  relevance	  
to	  RPS	  designs.	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  A.	  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing	  
	  
	  
G_10	  Systems	  that	  alert	  the	  pilot	  to	  a	  critical	  anomaly	  should	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  silent	  failure.	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation.	  
	  
	  
G_11	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  work	  environment	  that	  maintains	  pilot	  engagement,	  and	  minimizes	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  extended	  periods	  of	  low	  workload.	  
Supporting	  notes:	  The	  remote	  pilot	  may	  experience	  extended	  periods	  of	  low	  workload,	  
particularly	  when	  the	  pilot’s	  role	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  supervisory	  control	  of	  automation	  (Cummings,	  
Mastracchio,	  Thornburg,	  &	  Mkrtchyan,	  2013).	  It	  is	  well-­‐established	  that	  humans	  have	  difficulty	  
maintaining	  vigilance	  on	  tasks	  that	  involve	  long	  periods	  of	  monotonous	  monitoring.	  The	  pilot	  
may	  have	  to	  make	  a	  rapid	  transition	  from	  an	  unstimulating	  period	  of	  monitoring	  to	  a	  period	  of	  
high	  workload	  and	  quick	  decision-­‐making.	  Control	  stations	  tend	  to	  be	  relatively	  quiet,	  air	  
conditioned	  environments	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  noise.	  The	  experience	  of	  settings	  such	  as	  industrial	  
control	  rooms	  and	  locomotive	  cabs	  indicates	  that	  such	  unstimulating	  environments	  can	  make	  it	  
more	  difficult	  for	  personnel	  to	  remain	  alert,	  especially	  when	  fatigued.	  Control	  stations	  must	  be	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designed	  to	  maintain	  pilot	  engagement	  even	  during	  extended	  periods	  of	  uneventful	  operation.	  
This	  guideline	  does	  not	  specify	  how	  pilot	  engagement	  should	  be	  maintained,	  or	  how	  losses	  of	  
vigilance	  should	  be	  detected.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  a	  long	  history	  in	  the	  railroad	  
industry	  of	  “vigilance	  control	  devices”	  or	  “deadman’s	  handles”	  designed	  to	  maintain	  operator	  
vigilance.	  Some	  road	  vehicles	  now	  include	  devices	  intended	  to	  detect	  sleep	  episodes	  in	  drivers,	  
by	  monitoring	  eye	  closures	  or	  detecting	  reduced	  control	  inputs.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  C;	  Control	  station	  on	  ground;	  E.	  Unique	  characteristics	  of	  RPA	  
flight	  
	  
	  G_12	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  consistency	  of	  operation	  for	  common	  functions.	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation.	  
	  
	  
G_13	  The	  functions	  needed	  to	  safely	  control	  the	  aircraft	  under	  usual	  flight	  situations	  should	  be	  located	  in	  the	  pilot's	  primary	  field-­‐of-­‐view.	  	  	  




G_14	  Warnings	  and	  cautions	  should	  not	  be	  obscured	  by	  other	  RPS	  displays.	  	  






G_15	  “Part-­‐time	  display.	  If	  it	  is	  desired	  to	  inhibit	  some	  parameters	  from	  full-­‐time	  display,	  an	  equivalent	  level	  of	  safety	  to	  full-­‐time	  display	  should	  be	  demonstrated.	  Criteria	  to	  be	  considered	  include	  the	  following:	  (a)	  Continuous	  display	  of	  the	  parameter	  is	  not	  required	  for	  safety	  of	  flight	  in	  all	  normal	  flight	  phases.	  (b)	  The	  parameter	  is	  automatically	  displayed	  in	  flight	  phases	  where	  it	  is	  required.	  (c)	  The	  inhibited	  parameter	  is	  automatically	  displayed	  when	  its	  value	  indicates	  an	  abnormal	  condition,	  or	  when	  the	  parameter	  reaches	  an	  abnormal	  value.	  (d)	  Display	  of	  the	  inhibited	  parameter	  can	  be	  manually	  selected	  by	  the	  UAV	  crew	  without	  interfering	  with	  the	  display	  of	  other	  required	  information.	  (e)	  If	  the	  parameter	  fails	  to	  be	  displayed	  when	  required,	  the	  failure	  effect	  and	  compounding	  effects	  must	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  USAR.1309.	  The	  analysis	  is	  to	  clearly	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  display(s)	  of	  data	  is	  consistent	  with	  safe	  operation	  under	  all	  probable	  operating	  conditions.	  (f)	  The	  automatic,	  or	  requested,	  display	  of	  the	  inhibited	  parameter	  should	  not	  create	  unacceptable	  clutter	  on	  the	  display;	  simultaneous	  multiple	  "pop-­‐ups"	  must	  be	  considered.	  (g)	  If	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  new	  parameter	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  self-­‐evident,	  suitable	  alerting	  must	  accompany	  the	  automatic	  presentation”.	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Supporting	  notes:	  This	  material	  is	  taken	  verbatim	  from	  NATO	  (2009).	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation;	  H.	  Widespread	  use	  of	  interfaces	  
based	  on	  consumer	  products.	  
	  
	  
G_16	  Wherever	  possible,	  text	  messages,	  whether	  in	  dialog	  boxes,	  warning	  messages	  or	  other	  screen	  displays,	  should	  be	  presented	  in	  plain	  language,	  or	  using	  standard	  aviation	  terminology.	  	  
Supporting	  notes:	  Some	  RPS	  interfaces	  based	  on	  textual	  presentation	  of	  information	  have	  used	  
unnecessarily	  complicated	  or	  counter-­‐intuitive	  language.	  	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  G.	  Reliance	  on	  automation;	  H.	  Widespread	  use	  of	  interfaces	  
based	  on	  consumer	  products.	  
	  
G_17	  Controls	  intended	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  the	  pilot	  should	  be	  reachable	  from	  a	  seated	  position	  
Supporting	  notes:	  This	  principle	  has	  been	  violated	  in	  some	  current	  RPS	  designs.	  





G_18	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  bookrest	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  refer	  to	  documents	  without	  risk	  that	  the	  document	  will	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  keyboard	  or	  other	  flight	  controls.	  	  
Supporting	  notes:	  RPAS	  incidents	  have	  occurred	  where	  keyboard	  commands	  have	  been	  
inadvertently	  activated	  by	  contact	  with	  documents	  and	  other	  materials.	  	  	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  C:	  Control	  station	  on	  ground	  
	  
	  
G_19	  Appropriate	  priority	  controls	  should	  be	  available	  for	  RPAS	  functions	  that	  require	  either	  quick	  accessibility	  or	  constant	  availability.	  Priority	  control	  devices	  can	  include,	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to:	  (a)	  Touch	  panels,	  (b)	  Buttons,	  (c)	  Switches,	  (d)	  Joysticks,	  (e)	  Keyboard	  shortcuts.	  	  
(NATO,	  2004)	  
Supporting	  notes:	  Pilot	  actions	  that	  must	  be	  performed	  rapidly	  range	  from	  safety-­‐critical	  
actions	  such	  as	  collision	  avoidance	  maneuvers	  to	  less	  critical,	  but	  important	  routine	  actions	  
such	  as	  responding	  to	  an	  ATC	  request	  to	  “Ident”	  (Pestana,	  2008).	  	  Some	  RPS	  designs	  have	  
required	  pilots	  to	  perform	  complicated	  sequences	  of	  actions	  to	  perform	  time-­‐critical	  or	  routine	  
actions.	  Guidelines	  calling	  for	  RPS	  to	  enable	  pilots	  to	  rapidly	  perform	  such	  actions	  appear	  in	  
Access	  5	  (2006),	  NATO	  (2004)	  and	  NATO	  (2009).	  NATO	  (2009)	  states	  “Where	  the	  interface	  with	  
UAV	  crew	  is	  based	  on	  a	  “pull	  down	  menus”	  architecture,	  the	  controls	  that	  necessitate	  a	  prompt	  
reaction	  of	  the	  UAV	  crew	  must	  be	  accessible	  at	  the	  first	  level	  of	  the	  pull	  down	  menus,	  
otherwise,	  safety	  critical	  controls	  in	  the	  UCS	  must	  have	  dedicated	  knobs	  or	  levers”.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  A.	  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing;	  B.	  Control	  and	  Communication	  via	  






G_20	  If	  a	  display	  screen	  enables	  the	  pilot	  to	  move	  or	  rearrange	  display	  or	  control	  windows,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  place	  a	  window	  so	  as	  to	  obscure	  primary	  flight	  controls	  or	  displays.	  	  
Supporting	  notes:	  The	  use	  of	  reconfigurable	  and	  moveable	  screen	  windows	  and	  dialog	  boxes	  
introduces	  the	  possibility	  that	  critical	  displays	  could	  be	  obscured	  behind	  less-­‐critical	  screens	  or	  
dialog	  boxes.	  	  
Related	  special	  considerations:	  	  H.	  Widespread	  use	  of	  interfaces	  based	  on	  consumer	  products.	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Summary	  list	  of	  guidelines	  
	  
Note	  that	  in	  the	  following	  summary	  list,	  the	  type	  of	  guideline	  can	  be	  ascertained	  from	  the	  first	  letter	  in	  
the	  title	  as	  follows:	  
	   T_	  Task	  guidelines	  
	   I_	  Information	  content	  
	   C_	  Control	  inputs	  
	   P_	  Properties	  of	  the	  interface	  
	   G_	  General	  guidelines	  	  
	  
T_1.1.1	  If	  an	  on-­‐board	  camera	  is	  used	  for	  flight	  control	  tasks,	  the	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  align	  the	  
camera	  with	  the	  longitudinal	  access	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  
P_1.1.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  not	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  disengage	  automation	  in	  flight	  if	  the	  aircraft	  will	  depart	  
from	  controlled	  flight	  as	  a	  result.	  
P_1.1.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  prevent	  multiple	  operators	  from	  operating	  the	  same	  application	  or	  procedure	  at	  
any	  one	  time.	  
P_1.1.3	  It	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  set	  an	  RPS	  to	  a	  receive	  only	  mode,	  in	  which	  the	  RPS	  displays	  information	  
downlinked	  from	  an	  RPA	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  active	  command	  link..	  
T_1.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  status	  of	  consumable	  resources.	  
I_1.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  the	  status	  of	  consumable	  resources.	  
T_1.3.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  perform	  checks	  on	  the	  status	  of	  RPS	  systems.	  
T_1.3.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  perform	  a	  pre-­‐flight	  check	  on	  an	  alternate	  control	  station,	  or	  
confirm	  that	  this	  check	  has	  been	  performed.	  
T_1.3.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  performance	  of	  RPS	  support	  services,	  e.g.	  air	  
conditioning	  and	  electrical	  power.	  
I_1.3.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  health	  and	  status	  information	  on	  the	  RPS.	  
T_1.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  confirm	  spectrum	  availability	  before	  selecting	  link.	  
T_1.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  appropriate	  communication	  mode	  (e.g.	  
terrestrial/satellite,	  frequency).	  
T_1.5.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  selected	  communication	  mode.	  
T_1.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  confirm	  that	  communication	  link	  is	  effective,	  and	  established	  
with	  the	  correct	  UA.	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T_1.5.5	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  identify	  if	  more	  than	  one	  control	  station	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  
UA.	  
T_1.5.6	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  link	  strength,	  or	  link	  abnormalities.	  
T_1.5.7	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  link	  latency,	  where	  relevant.	  
T_1.5.8	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  anticipate	  link	  degradations	  or	  diminished	  link	  strength.	  
T_1.5.9	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  geographic	  limits	  of	  the	  link	  
and	  potential	  obstructions	  to	  signal.	  
T_1.5.10	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  crew	  actions	  or	  control	  inputs	  that	  
could	  interrupt	  or	  degrade	  the	  link.	  
T_1.5.11	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  respond	  to	  interference	  with	  the	  signal,	  (e.g.	  other	  users	  of	  
frequency,	  jamming	  attempts).	  
T_1.5.12	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  change	  the	  link	  during	  flight	  operations	  as	  necessary.	  
T_1.5.13	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  assess	  link	  strength	  and	  quality	  before	  switching	  link.	  
T_1.5.14	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  define	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  loss	  of	  link	  that	  must	  occur	  before	  
the	  lost	  link	  alert	  is	  activated,	  or	  the	  RPA	  enters	  its	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  
T_1.5.15	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  manage	  resumption	  of	  the	  signal	  after	  a	  lost	  link.	  
I_1.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  providing	  the	  pilot	  with	  predictive	  information	  on	  the	  quality	  and	  
strength	  of	  a	  C2	  link	  before	  the	  link	  is	  actively	  used	  to	  control	  the	  UA.	  
I_1.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  identify	  which	  C2	  link	  settings	  are	  
active	  (e.g.	  selected	  frequency,	  satellite	  vs	  terrestrial).	  
I_1.5.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  to	  confirm	  that	  effective	  control	  is	  established	  
with	  the	  correct	  UA.	  
I_1.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  the	  geographic	  limits	  of	  the	  link.	  
I_1.5.5	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  spectrum	  activity	  from	  a	  spectrum	  
analyzer.	  
I_1.5.6	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  RPA	  is	  approaching	  an	  area	  where	  link	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  lost.	  
I_1.5.7	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  link	  is	  lost.	  
I_1.5.8	  The	  RPA	  will	  transmit	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  transponder	  code	  when	  the	  link	  is	  lost.	  
I_1.5.9	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  link.	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I_1.5.10	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  whenever	  the	  C2	  link	  experiences	  interference,	  whether	  resulting	  
from	  natural	  phenomena,	  payload	  or	  other	  equipment	  associated	  with	  the	  RPAS,	  or	  human	  activities	  
(such	  as	  jamming	  or	  other	  users	  on	  frequency).	  
I_1.5.11	  The	  RPS	  should	  display	  to	  the	  pilot	  the	  source	  of	  downlink	  transmissions.	  
I_1.5.12	  Where	  relevant,	  the	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  link	  latency,	  in	  
milliseconds.	  
I_1.5.13	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  anticipate	  link	  degradations	  or	  
diminished	  link	  strength.	  This	  information	  may	  include	  link	  footprint,	  including	  areas	  that	  may	  be	  
affected	  by	  terrain	  masking.	  
I_1.5.14	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  manage	  link	  security.	  
I_1.5.15	  The	  RPS	  should	  inform	  the	  pilot	  when	  a	  lost	  link	  is	  resumed.	  
C_1.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  communication	  mode	  (e.g.	  terrestrial/satellite,	  
frequency,	  transmission	  power).	  
C_1.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  control	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  request	  a	  link	  status	  report.	  
C_1.5.3	  If	  antenna	  selection	  is	  performed	  by	  the	  pilot,	  then	  the	  RPS	  should	  support	  an	  external	  
command	  to	  set	  the	  antenna	  used	  for	  communication.	  
C_1.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  set	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  link	  outage	  that	  must	  occur	  before	  a	  lost	  
link	  response	  is	  triggered.	  
P_1.5.1	  “There	  must	  be	  an	  alert	  for	  the	  UAS	  [RPAS]	  crew,	  via	  a	  clear	  and	  distinct	  aural	  and	  visual	  signal,	  
for	  any	  total	  loss	  of	  the	  command	  and	  control	  data	  link”.	  
P_1.5.2	  The	  aural	  warning	  for	  lost	  control	  link	  should	  be	  a	  unique	  sound,	  not	  also	  used	  to	  signify	  other	  
conditions.	  
P_1.5.3	  The	  maximum	  range	  of	  the	  C2	  datalink	  (datalink	  footprint)	  for	  all	  altitudes	  and	  directions	  
relative	  to	  the	  signal	  source	  should	  be	  presented	  visually	  to	  the	  pilot,	  overlaid	  on	  a	  map	  display.	  
P_1.5.4	  Areas	  where	  the	  C2	  link	  (datalink	  footprint)	  are	  predicted	  to	  be	  masked	  by	  terrain	  should	  be	  
displayed	  on	  the	  C2	  datalink	  display.	  
P_1.5.5	  If	  the	  datalink	  footprint	  can	  be	  suppressed,	  it	  should	  be	  automatically	  displayed	  when	  the	  RPA	  is	  
approaching	  a	  location	  where	  a	  loss	  of	  link	  is	  likely.	  
P_1.5.6	  The	  C2	  datalink	  footprint	  should	  be	  easily	  distinguishable	  from	  other	  footprints	  that	  may	  be	  
present	  on	  the	  operator	  map	  display.	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P_1.5.7	  If	  the	  payload	  utilizes	  a	  link	  separate	  to	  the	  aircraft	  control	  link,	  any	  display	  of	  payload	  link	  
quality	  should	  be	  separate	  and	  clearly	  distinguishable	  from	  displays	  for	  the	  aircraft	  control	  link.	  
P_1.5.8	  If	  an	  aural	  warning	  is	  used	  to	  indicate	  loss	  of	  payload	  link,	  the	  sound	  should	  be	  dissimilar	  to	  that	  
used	  to	  indicate	  loss	  of	  control	  link.	  
P_1.5.9	  Security	  features	  designed	  to	  prevent	  unapproved	  access	  (logon	  and	  logoff	  functions)	  should	  
not	  result	  in	  inadvertent	  lockouts	  of	  authorized	  personnel.	  
P_1.5.10	  The	  RPS,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  RPAS	  should	  comply	  with	  control	  link	  
latency	  (time	  from	  initiation	  of	  a	  maneuver	  to	  a	  measurable	  response	  by	  the	  RPA)	  requirements	  that	  are	  
established	  at	  a	  level	  similar	  to	  conventionally-­‐piloted	  aircraft.	  
T_1.6.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  control	  to	  be	  transferred	  between	  a	  giving	  and	  receiving	  RPS	  in	  a	  manner	  
that	  is	  seamless	  and	  transparent	  to	  ATC.	  
T_1.6.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  continuity	  of	  pilot	  function	  to	  be	  maintained	  during	  the	  transfer	  of	  
control	  between	  a	  giving	  and	  receiving	  RPS.	  
T_1.6.3	  “The	  RPS	  shall	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  ensure	  that	  operating	  parameters	  are	  identical	  before	  and	  
after	  handover”.	  
T_1.6..4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  pass	  RPA	  control	  (handover)	  to	  another	  RPS	  and	  monitor	  the	  
status	  of	  the	  handover.	  
T_1.6.5	  In	  cases	  where	  more	  than	  one	  	  RPS	  could	  be	  linked	  with	  the	  RPA,	  each	  RPS	  will	  enable	  the	  pilot	  
to	  monitor	  which	  entity	  has	  control	  of	  the	  aircraft	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  entity	  has	  control..	  
T_1.6.6	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots	  to	  confirm	  that	  control	  settings	  are	  
appropriate	  and	  consistent	  before	  a	  handover	  is	  accomplished.	  
T_1.6.7	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  receiving	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  status	  of	  the	  RPA	  by	  receiving	  
telemetry	  from	  the	  RPA	  before	  establishing	  control	  of	  the	  UA.	  
T_1.6.8	  The	  RPS	  should	  facilitate	  a	  handover	  briefing	  between	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots.	  
T_1.6.9	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  receiving	  pilot	  with	  a	  means	  of	  confirming	  that	  control	  has	  been	  
established	  with	  the	  UA.	  
I_1.6.1	  The	  pilot	  should	  be	  presented	  with	  information	  necessary	  to	  confirm	  that	  flight-­‐critical	  settings	  
in	  the	  receiving	  RPS	  are	  consistent	  with	  settings	  in	  the	  giving	  RPS.	  
I_1.6.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  level	  of	  involvement	  indicator	  to	  the	  pilot	  to	  show	  whether	  the	  RPS	  has	  




C_1.6.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  desired	  level	  of	  involvement	  with	  a	  UA,	  ranging	  
from	  monitoring	  telemetry	  without	  an	  active	  uplink,	  to	  telemetry	  with	  full	  control	  via	  an	  active	  uplink.	  
C_1.6.2	  There	  should	  be	  a	  means	  for	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots	  to	  communicate	  before,	  during	  and	  
after	  the	  handover.	  
P_1.6.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  suitable	  displays	  to	  enable	  briefings	  to	  be	  conducted	  between	  a	  seated	  
pilot	  and	  a	  standing	  pilot	  during	  control	  handovers.	  	  This	  may	  include	  the	  use	  of	  large	  scale	  synoptic	  
displays.	  
P_1.6.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  control	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  another	  RPS	  without	  any	  gap	  in	  control	  
occurring	  during	  the	  handover.	  
T_2.1.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  ensure	  that	  both	  the	  runway	  and	  approach	  path	  are	  clear	  of	  
traffic	  before	  taxiing	  onto	  the	  active	  runway.	  
T_2.1.2	  “The	  UAS	  [RPAS]	  shall	  be	  capable	  of	  transitioning	  from	  an	  instrument	  approach	  procedure	  to	  a	  
safe	  landing,	  either	  by	  visual	  reference	  of	  a	  flight	  crewmember	  at	  the	  airport	  or	  by	  other	  means	  
acceptable	  to	  the	  FAA”.	  
P_2.1.1	  Map	  displays	  should	  be	  able	  to	  support	  a	  variety	  of	  map	  types	  including	  aeronautical	  charts	  and	  
presentations	  of	  Digital	  Terrain	  Elevation	  Data	  (DTED).	  
P_2.1.2	  Map	  displays	  should	  be	  configurable	  to	  “North	  up”	  or	  “Track	  up”.	  
P_2.1.3	  If	  control	  is	  via	  a	  terrestrial	  radio,	  the	  location	  of	  (or	  direction	  to)	  the	  ground	  
transmitter/receiver	  should	  be	  shown	  on	  the	  map.	  
P_2.1.4	  Primary	  flight	  controls	  for	  controlling	  the	  RPA	  (heading,	  attitude,	  speed)	  should	  be	  available	  at	  
all	  times	  through	  dedicated	  physical	  controls.	  	  If	  the	  use	  of	  software-­‐based	  controls	  cannot	  be	  avoided,	  
then	  the	  controls	  should	  be	  immediately	  accessible	  at	  the	  top	  level	  of	  the	  control	  interface.	  
T_2.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  “observe”	  and	  comply	  with	  signage,	  painted	  markings,	  and	  
warning	  lights	  during	  surface	  operations.	  
T_2.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  weather	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  the	  flight.	  
T_2.2.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  avoid	  weather	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  the	  flight.	  
I_2.2.1	  “The	  operator	  should	  be	  able	  to	  display	  flight	  corridors,	  controlled	  airspace	  and	  any	  other	  
relevant	  airspace	  co-­‐ordination	  information”.	  
I_2.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  display	  weather	  information	  to	  the	  pilot.	  
I_2.2.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  the	  location	  of	  icing	  conditions.	  
I_2.2.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  RPA	  enters	  icing	  conditions.	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I_2.2.5	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  RPA	  encounters	  significant	  air	  turbulence.	  
T_2.4.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  remain	  aware	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure	  as	  the	  flight	  
progresses.	  
T_2.4.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  update	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure	  as	  the	  flight	  
progresses.	  
T_2.4.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  must	  elapse	  between	  the	  onset	  
of	  a	  lost	  link	  event	  and	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  
I_2.4.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  a	  display	  indicating	  the	  future	  flightpath	  of	  the	  aircraft	  
should	  a	  lost	  link	  occur.	  
I_2.4.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  whenever	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  procedure	  would	  create	  a	  
hazard	  (such	  as	  directing	  the	  aircraft	  towards	  terrain,	  or	  into	  non-­‐authorized	  airspace).	  
I_2.4.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  display	  to	  the	  pilot	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  will	  elapse	  between	  the	  onset	  of	  a	  lost	  
link	  event	  and	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  
I_2.4.4	  In	  the	  event	  of	  a	  lost	  link,	  the	  RPS	  should	  display	  the	  time	  remaining	  until	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  
aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  
P_2.4.1	  The	  flightpath	  that	  would	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  aircraft	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  should	  be	  clearly	  
distinguishable	  from	  the	  programmed	  normal	  flightpath	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  
P_2.4.2	  Information	  on	  the	  programmed	  lost	  link	  behavior	  of	  the	  aircraft	  should	  be	  readily	  available	  to	  
the	  pilot,	  without	  the	  need	  for	  complex	  interactions	  with	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface.	  
T_2.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  decide	  when	  to	  terminate	  the	  flight	  via	  controlled	  impact,	  
ditching	  or	  parachute	  descent.	  
T_2.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  identify	  a	  suitable	  location	  for	  flight	  termination.	  
T_2.5.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  terminate	  the	  flight	  in	  a	  pre-­‐designated	  area.	  
T_2.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  use	  real-­‐time	  information	  to	  confirm	  that	  flight	  termination	  
at	  the	  selected	  location	  will	  not	  present	  unacceptable	  risk	  to	  people	  or	  property.	  
I_2.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  real-­‐time	  imagery	  of	  the	  selected	  impact,	  ditching	  or	  
parachute	  descent	  site	  to	  confirm	  that	  a	  safe	  termination	  can	  be	  accomplished.	  
I_2.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  an	  alert	  to	  the	  pilot	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  flight	  termination	  system	  is	  
about	  to	  be	  activated.	  
P_2.5.1	  When	  the	  RPA	  is	  equipped	  with	  a	  flight	  termination	  system:	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P_2.5.1a.	  The	  use	  of	  these	  controls	  should	  be	  intuitive	  and	  minimize	  the	  possibility	  of	  confusion	  and	  
subsequent	  inadvertent	  operation.	  
P_2.5.1b.	  Two	  distinct	  and	  dissimilar	  actions	  of	  the	  RPAS	  crew	  should	  be	  required	  to	  initiate	  the	  flight	  
termination	  command.	  
P_2.5.2	  Before	  the	  final	  step	  in	  activating	  the	  flight	  termination	  system	  is	  reached,	  the	  RPS	  should	  
provide	  an	  aural	  and	  visual	  alert	  to	  the	  pilot	  that	  flight	  termination	  is	  about	  to	  be	  activated.	  
P_2.5.3	  The	  aural	  alert	  warning	  of	  imminent	  flight	  termination	  should	  involve	  a	  unique	  sound.	  This	  
should	  preferably	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  verbal	  message	  such	  as	  “Flight	  termination!”	  
P_2.5.4	  When	  the	  RPA	  is	  equipped	  with	  a	  flight	  termination	  system,	  flight	  termination	  controls	  should	  
be	  safeguarded	  from	  interference	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  inadvertent	  operation.	  
T_3.1.1	  When	  operating	  near	  a	  non-­‐towered	  airport,	  the	  pilot	  should	  be	  able	  to	  exchange	  intent	  
information	  with	  other	  airport	  traffic	  through	  standard	  communications	  on	  the	  airport	  common	  traffic	  
advisory	  frequency	  (CTAF).	  
T_3.1.2	  The	  remote	  pilot	  should	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  an	  alternate	  communications	  method	  with	  ATC	  if	  
the	  duration	  of	  the	  communications	  loss	  exceeds	  requirements	  for	  the	  operating	  environment.	  
I_3.1.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  include	  alternate	  means	  for	  the	  pilot	  to	  communicate	  with	  ATC	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  
loss	  of	  C2	  link.	  
I_3.1.2	  Current	  settings	  of	  communication	  controls.	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  
about	  the	  current	  state,	  mode,	  or	  setting	  of	  the	  controls	  used	  for	  communication	  with	  ATC.	  
P_3.1.1	  The	  voice	  communication	  delay	  between	  the	  pilot	  and	  ATC	  should	  have	  a	  mean	  less	  than	  or	  
equal	  to	  250	  ms.	  
P_3.1.2	  The	  voice	  communication	  delay	  between	  the	  pilot	  and	  ATC	  should	  be	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  300	  
ms.	  (99th	  percentile).	  
P_3.1.3	  The	  voice	  communication	  delay	  between	  the	  pilot	  and	  ATC	  should	  be	  within	  a	  maximum	  of	  350	  
ms.	  
T_3.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  RPAS	  crewmembers	  to	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  (co-­‐located	  or	  
not)	  in	  order	  to	  perform	  the	  necessary	  flight	  tasks.	  
T_3.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  ensure	  that	  commands	  sent	  to	  the	  aircraft	  on	  the	  ground	  do	  
not	  create	  a	  safety	  hazard	  for	  ground	  support	  personnel.	  
I_3.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  imagery	  of	  the	  aircraft	  whenever	  the	  pilot	  has	  control	  of	  
the	  aircraft	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  ground	  support	  personnel	  are	  interacting	  with	  the	  aircraft.	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I_3.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  a	  communication	  link	  with	  ground	  support	  personnel	  while	  
they	  are	  interacting	  with	  the	  aircraft.	  
T_3.3.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  communicate	  with	  weather	  information	  services	  and	  other	  
ancillary	  services.	  
G_1	  RPAS	  developers	  should	  follow	  recognized	  human-­‐centered	  design	  processes	  including	  the	  
following:	  
G_1a.	  Develop	  a	  full	  set	  of	  pilot	  tasks	  and	  intended	  operations	  for	  which	  the	  RPS	  will	  be	  used.	  	  
These	  will	  help	  drive	  ensuring	  a	  thorough	  design	  that	  provides	  all	  systems,	  information,	  and	  
controls	  that	  the	  pilots	  will	  need.	  
G_1b.	  Develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  potential	  safety	  critical	  errors	  that	  the	  pilots	  may	  make	  
when	  accomplishing	  their	  tasks.	  	  These	  will	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  making	  trade-­‐offs	  in	  
design	  decisions	  by	  focusing	  on	  design	  attributes	  that	  will	  mitigate	  critical	  errors	  as	  needed.	  
G_1c.	  Develop	  a	  full	  set	  of	  information	  requirements	  for	  the	  tasks	  the	  pilots	  will	  need	  to	  
accomplish.	  	  These	  requirements	  should	  be	  developed	  with	  other	  design	  requirements	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  systems	  engineering	  process.	  	  They	  will	  help	  ensure	  that	  the	  appropriate	  
information	  is	  provided	  to	  the	  pilots	  and	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  making	  design	  decisions.	  
G_1d.	  Develop	  a	  full	  set	  of	  requirements	  for	  controls	  that	  the	  pilot	  will	  need	  to	  accomplish	  their	  
tasks.	  	  These	  requirements	  should	  be	  developed	  with	  other	  design	  requirements	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  systems	  engineering	  process.	  	  They	  will	  help	  ensure	  that	  all	  the	  pilot	  controls	  
are	  planned	  for	  as	  design	  decisions	  are	  made.	  
G_1e.	  Document	  all	  of	  the	  results	  of	  these	  processes	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  continually	  updated	  
when	  design	  decisions	  and	  trade-­‐offs	  are	  made	  during	  the	  design	  process.	  	  Good	  documentation	  
will	  also	  help	  the	  human	  factors	  design	  processes	  to	  be	  integrated	  with	  the	  other	  systems	  
engineering	  development	  and	  design	  processes.	  
G_2	  The	  use	  of	  multi-­‐mode	  functions	  on	  flight	  controls	  should	  be	  minimized.	  If	  modes	  are	  used,	  the	  
system	  should	  clearly	  indicate	  the	  current	  mode,	  and	  other	  potential	  modes	  should	  be	  indicated.	  
G_3	  If	  changing	  a	  mode	  selection	  of	  an	  automated	  system	  has	  a	  safety	  consequence,	  the	  action	  to	  select	  
that	  mode	  should	  be	  alerted,	  and	  additional	  precautions	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  prevent	  inadvertent	  
selection.	  
G_4	  Payload	  controls	  should	  be	  separate	  from	  controls	  with	  safety-­‐of-­‐flight	  functions.	  
G_5	  It	  should	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  reconfigure	  a	  safety-­‐of-­‐flight	  control	  to	  perform	  a	  payload	  function.	  
G_6	  Activation	  of	  a	  key	  or	  button	  should	  provide	  tactile	  or	  auditory	  feedback	  to	  the	  pilot.	  
G_7	  There	  should	  be	  a	  clear	  indication	  to	  the	  pilot	  when	  a	  command	  has	  been	  received	  by	  the	  RPA.	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G_8	  Any	  unrecognized	  entry	  made	  by	  the	  pilot	  at	  the	  RPS	  should	  cause	  an	  informative	  error	  message	  to	  
be	  displayed	  and	  not	  affect	  the	  status	  or	  operation	  of	  any	  system.	  
G_9	  Flightcrew	  alerting.	  (Quoted	  verbatim	  from	  CFR	  §	  25.1322)	  
G_9	  “(a)	  Flightcrew	  alerts	  must:	  (1)	  Provide	  the	  flightcrew	  with	  the	  information	  needed	  to:	  (i)	  
Identify	  non-­‐normal	  operation	  or	  airplane	  system	  conditions,	  and	  (ii)	  Determine	  the	  appropriate	  
actions,	  if	  any.	  (2)	  Be	  readily	  and	  easily	  detectable	  and	  intelligible	  by	  the	  flightcrew	  under	  all	  
foreseeable	  operating	  conditions,	  including	  conditions	  where	  multiple	  alerts	  are	  provided.	  (3)	  Be	  
removed	  when	  the	  alerting	  condition	  no	  longer	  exists.	  
G_9	  (b)	  Alerts	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  following	  prioritization	  hierarchy	  based	  on	  the	  urgency	  of	  
flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  response.	  (1)	  Warning:	  For	  conditions	  that	  require	  immediate	  
flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  immediate	  flightcrew	  response.	  (2)	  Caution:	  For	  conditions	  that	  
require	  immediate	  flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  subsequent	  flightcrew	  response.	  (3)	  Advisory:	  For	  
conditions	  that	  require	  flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  may	  require	  subsequent	  flightcrew	  response.	  
G_9	  (c)	  Warning	  and	  caution	  alerts	  must:	  (1)	  Be	  prioritized	  within	  each	  category,	  when	  
necessary.	  (2)	  Provide	  timely	  attention-­‐getting	  cues	  through	  at	  least	  two	  different	  senses	  by	  a	  
combination	  of	  aural,	  visual,	  or	  tactile	  indications.	  (3)	  Permit	  each	  occurrence	  of	  the	  attention-­‐
getting	  cues	  required	  by	  paragraph	  (c)(2)	  of	  this	  section	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  and	  suppressed,	  
unless	  they	  are	  required	  to	  be	  continuous.	  
G_9	  (d)	  The	  alert	  function	  must	  be	  designed	  to	  minimize	  the	  effects	  of	  false	  and	  nuisance	  alerts.	  
In	  particular,	  it	  must	  be	  designed	  to:	  (1)	  Prevent	  the	  presentation	  of	  an	  alert	  that	  is	  
inappropriate	  or	  unnecessary.	  (2)	  Provide	  a	  means	  to	  suppress	  an	  attention-­‐getting	  component	  
of	  an	  alert	  caused	  by	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  alerting	  function	  that	  interferes	  with	  the	  flightcrew's	  ability	  
to	  safely	  operate	  the	  airplane.	  This	  means	  must	  not	  be	  readily	  available	  to	  the	  flightcrew	  so	  that	  
it	  could	  be	  operated	  inadvertently	  or	  by	  habitual	  reflexive	  action.	  When	  an	  alert	  is	  suppressed,	  
there	  must	  be	  a	  clear	  and	  unmistakable	  annunciation	  to	  the	  flightcrew	  that	  the	  alert	  has	  been	  
suppressed.	  
G_9	  (e)	  Visual	  alert	  indications	  must:	  (1)	  Conform	  to	  the	  following	  color	  convention:(i)	  Red	  for	  
warning	  alert	  indications.	  (ii)	  Amber	  or	  yellow	  for	  caution	  alert	  indications.	  (iii)	  Any	  color	  except	  
red	  or	  green	  for	  advisory	  alert	  indications.	  (2)	  Use	  visual	  coding	  techniques,	  together	  with	  other	  
alerting	  function	  elements	  on	  the	  flight	  deck,	  to	  distinguish	  between	  warning,	  caution,	  and	  
advisory	  alert	  indications,	  if	  they	  are	  presented	  on	  monochromatic	  displays	  that	  are	  not	  capable	  
of	  conforming	  to	  the	  color	  convention	  in	  paragraph	  (e)(1)	  of	  this	  section.	  
G_9	  (f)	  Use	  of	  the	  colors	  red,	  amber,	  and	  yellow	  on	  the	  flight	  deck	  for	  functions	  other	  than	  
flightcrew	  alerting	  must	  be	  limited	  and	  must	  not	  adversely	  affect	  flightcrew	  alerting”.	  
G_10	  Systems	  that	  alert	  the	  pilot	  to	  a	  critical	  anomaly	  should	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  silent	  failure.	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G_11	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  work	  environment	  that	  maintains	  pilot	  engagement,	  and	  minimizes	  the	  
negative	  impact	  of	  extended	  periods	  of	  low	  workload.	  
G_12	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  consistency	  of	  operation	  for	  common	  functions.	  
G_13	  The	  functions	  needed	  to	  safely	  control	  the	  aircraft	  under	  usual	  flight	  situations	  should	  be	  located	  
in	  the	  pilot's	  primary	  field-­‐of-­‐view.	  
G_14	  Warnings	  and	  cautions	  should	  not	  be	  obscured	  by	  other	  RPS	  displays.	  
G_15	  “Part-­‐time	  display.	  If	  it	  is	  desired	  to	  inhibit	  some	  parameters	  from	  full-­‐time	  display,	  an	  equivalent	  
level	  of	  safety	  to	  full-­‐time	  display	  should	  be	  demonstrated.	  Criteria	  to	  be	  considered	  include	  the	  
following:	  (a)	  Continuous	  display	  of	  the	  parameter	  is	  not	  required	  for	  safety	  of	  flight	  in	  all	  normal	  flight	  
phases.	  (b)	  The	  parameter	  is	  automatically	  displayed	  in	  flight	  phases	  where	  it	  is	  required.	  (c)	  The	  
inhibited	  parameter	  is	  automatically	  displayed	  when	  its	  value	  indicates	  an	  abnormal	  condition,	  or	  when	  
the	  parameter	  reaches	  an	  abnormal	  value.	  (d)	  Display	  of	  the	  inhibited	  parameter	  can	  be	  manually	  
selected	  by	  the	  UAV	  crew	  without	  interfering	  with	  the	  display	  of	  other	  required	  information.	  (e)	  If	  the	  
parameter	  fails	  to	  be	  displayed	  when	  required,	  the	  failure	  effect	  and	  compounding	  effects	  must	  meet	  
the	  requirements	  of	  USAR.1309.	  The	  analysis	  is	  to	  clearly	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  display(s)	  of	  data	  is	  
consistent	  with	  safe	  operation	  under	  all	  probable	  operating	  conditions.	  (f)	  The	  automatic,	  or	  requested,	  
display	  of	  the	  inhibited	  parameter	  should	  not	  create	  unacceptable	  clutter	  on	  the	  display;	  simultaneous	  
multiple	  "pop-­‐ups"	  must	  be	  considered.	  (g)	  If	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  new	  parameter	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  self-­‐
evident,	  suitable	  alerting	  must	  accompany	  the	  automatic	  presentation”.	  
G_16	  Wherever	  possible,	  text	  messages,	  whether	  in	  dialog	  boxes,	  warning	  messages	  or	  other	  screen	  
displays,	  should	  be	  presented	  in	  plain	  language,	  or	  using	  standard	  aviation	  terminology.	  
G_17	  Controls	  intended	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  the	  pilot	  should	  be	  reachable	  from	  a	  seated	  position	  
G_18	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  bookrest	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  refer	  to	  documents	  without	  risk	  that	  the	  
document	  will	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  keyboard	  or	  other	  flight	  controls.	  
G_19	  Appropriate	  priority	  controls	  should	  be	  available	  for	  RPAS	  functions	  that	  require	  either	  quick	  
accessibility	  or	  constant	  availability.	  Priority	  control	  devices	  can	  include,	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to:	  (a)	  Touch	  
panels,	  (b)	  Buttons,	  (c)	  Switches,	  (d)	  Joysticks,	  (e)	  Keyboard	  shortcuts.	  
G_20	  If	  a	  display	  screen	  enables	  the	  pilot	  to	  move	  or	  rearrange	  display	  or	  control	  windows,	  it	  should	  not	  
be	  possible	  to	  place	  a	  window	  so	  as	  to	  obscure	  primary	  flight	  controls	  or	  displays.	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Guidelines	  organized	  by	  type	  
Task-­‐related	  guidelines	  
	  
T_1.1.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  which	  entity	  has	  control	  of	  the	  aircraft	  and	  to	  what	  
extent	  the	  entity	  has	  control.	  
T_1.1.2	  If	  an	  on-­‐board	  camera	  is	  used	  for	  flight	  control	  tasks,	  the	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  align	  the	  
camera	  with	  the	  longitudinal	  access	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  
T_1.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  status	  of	  consumable	  resources.	  
T_1.3.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  perform	  checks	  on	  the	  status	  of	  RPS	  systems.	  
T_1.3.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  perform	  a	  pre-­‐flight	  check	  on	  an	  alternate	  control	  station,	  or	  
confirm	  that	  this	  check	  has	  been	  performed.	  
T_1.3.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  performance	  of	  RPS	  support	  services,	  e.g.	  air	  
conditioning	  and	  electrical	  power.	  
T_1.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  confirm	  spectrum	  availability	  before	  selecting	  link.	  
T_1.5.10	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  crew	  actions	  or	  control	  inputs	  that	  
could	  interrupt	  or	  degrade	  the	  link.	  
T_1.5.11	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  respond	  to	  interference	  with	  the	  signal,	  (e.g.	  other	  users	  of	  
frequency,	  jamming	  attempts).	  
T_1.5.12	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  change	  the	  link	  during	  flight	  operations	  as	  necessary.	  
T_1.5.13	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  assess	  link	  strength	  and	  quality	  before	  switching	  link.	  
T_1.5.14	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  define	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  loss	  of	  link	  that	  must	  occur	  before	  
the	  lost	  link	  alert	  is	  activated,	  or	  the	  RPA	  enters	  its	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  
T_1.5.15	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  manage	  resumption	  of	  the	  signal	  after	  a	  lost	  link.	  
T_1.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  appropriate	  communication	  mode	  (e.g.	  
terrestrial/satellite,	  frequency).	  
T_1.5.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  selected	  communication	  mode.	  
T_1.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  confirm	  that	  communication	  link	  is	  effective,	  and	  established	  
with	  the	  correct	  UA.	  




T_1.5.6	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  link	  strength,	  or	  link	  abnormalities.	  
T_1.5.7	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  awareness	  of	  link	  latency,	  where	  relevant.	  
T_1.5.8	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  anticipate	  link	  degradations	  or	  diminished	  link	  strength.	  
T_1.5.9	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  maintain	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  geographic	  limits	  of	  the	  link	  
and	  potential	  obstructions	  to	  signal.	  
T_1.6..4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  pass	  RPA	  control	  (handover)	  to	  another	  RPS	  and	  monitor	  the	  
status	  of	  the	  handover.	  
T_1.6.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  control	  to	  be	  transferred	  between	  a	  giving	  and	  receiving	  RPS	  in	  a	  manner	  
that	  is	  seamless	  and	  transparent	  to	  ATC.	  
T_1.6.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  continuity	  of	  pilot	  function	  to	  be	  maintained	  during	  the	  transfer	  of	  
control	  between	  a	  giving	  and	  receiving	  RPS.	  
T_1.6.3	  “The	  RPS	  shall	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  ensure	  that	  operating	  parameters	  are	  identical	  before	  and	  
after	  handover”.	  
T_1.6.5	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  which	  entity	  has	  control	  of	  the	  aircraft	  and	  to	  what	  
extent	  the	  entity	  has	  control.	  
T_1.6.6	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots	  to	  confirm	  that	  control	  settings	  are	  
appropriate	  and	  consistent	  before	  a	  handover	  is	  accomplished.	  
T_1.6.7	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  receiving	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  status	  of	  the	  RPA	  by	  receiving	  
telemetry	  from	  the	  RPA	  before	  establishing	  control	  of	  the	  UA.	  
T_1.6.8	  The	  RPS	  should	  facilitate	  a	  handover	  briefing	  between	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots.	  
T_1.6.9	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  receiving	  pilot	  with	  a	  means	  of	  confirming	  that	  control	  has	  been	  
established	  with	  the	  UA.	  
T_2.1.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  ensure	  that	  both	  the	  runway	  and	  approach	  path	  are	  clear	  of	  
traffic	  before	  taxiing	  onto	  the	  active	  runway.	  
T_2.1.2	  “The	  UAS	  [RPAS]	  shall	  be	  capable	  of	  transitioning	  from	  an	  instrument	  approach	  procedure	  to	  a	  
safe	  landing,	  either	  by	  visual	  reference	  of	  a	  flight	  crewmember	  at	  the	  airport	  or	  by	  other	  means	  
acceptable	  to	  the	  FAA.”	  
T_2.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  “observe”	  and	  comply	  with	  signage,	  painted	  markings,	  and	  
warning	  lights	  during	  surface	  operations.	  
T_2.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  weather	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  the	  flight.	  
T_2.2.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  avoid	  weather	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  the	  flight.	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T_2.4.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  remain	  aware	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure	  as	  the	  flight	  
progresses.	  
T_2.4.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  update	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure	  as	  the	  flight	  
progresses.	  
T_2.4.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  must	  elapse	  between	  the	  onset	  
of	  a	  lost	  link	  event	  and	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  
T_2.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  decide	  when	  to	  terminate	  the	  flight	  via	  controlled	  impact,	  
ditching	  or	  parachute	  descent.	  
T_2.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  identify	  a	  suitable	  location	  for	  flight	  termination.	  
T_2.5.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  terminate	  the	  flight	  in	  a	  pre-­‐designated	  area.	  
T_2.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  use	  real-­‐time	  information	  to	  confirm	  that	  flight	  termination	  
at	  the	  selected	  location	  will	  not	  present	  unacceptable	  risk	  to	  people	  or	  property.	  
T_3.1.1	  When	  operating	  near	  a	  non-­‐towered	  airport,	  the	  pilot	  should	  be	  able	  to	  exchange	  intent	  
information	  with	  other	  airport	  traffic	  through	  standard	  communications	  on	  the	  airport	  common	  traffic	  
advisory	  frequency	  (CTAF).	  
T_3.1.2	  The	  remote	  pilot	  should	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  an	  alternate	  communications	  method	  with	  ATC	  if	  
the	  duration	  of	  the	  communications	  loss	  exceeds	  requirements	  for	  the	  operating	  environment.	  
T_3.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  RPAS	  crewmembers	  to	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  (co-­‐located	  or	  
not)	  in	  order	  to	  perform	  the	  necessary	  flight	  tasks.	  
T_3.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  ensure	  that	  commands	  sent	  to	  the	  aircraft	  on	  the	  ground	  do	  
not	  create	  a	  safety	  hazard	  for	  ground	  support	  personnel.	  
T_3.3.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  communicate	  with	  weather	  information	  services	  and	  other	  
ancillary	  services.	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Information-­‐related	  guidelines	  	  	  
I_1.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  the	  status	  of	  consumable	  resources.	  
I_1.3.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  health	  and	  status	  information	  on	  the	  RPS.	  
I_1.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  providing	  the	  pilot	  with	  predictive	  information	  on	  the	  quality	  and	  
strength	  of	  a	  C2	  link	  before	  the	  link	  is	  actively	  used	  to	  control	  the	  UA.	  
I_1.5.10	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  whenever	  the	  C2	  link	  experiences	  interference,	  whether	  resulting	  
from	  natural	  phenomena,	  payload	  or	  other	  equipment	  associated	  with	  the	  RPAS,	  or	  human	  activities	  
(such	  as	  jamming	  or	  other	  users	  on	  frequency).	  
I_1.5.11	  The	  RPS	  should	  display	  to	  the	  pilot	  the	  source	  of	  downlink	  transmissions.	  
I_1.5.12	  Where	  relevant,	  the	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  link	  latency,	  in	  
milliseconds.	  
I_1.5.13	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  anticipate	  link	  degradations	  or	  
diminished	  link	  strength.	  This	  information	  may	  include	  link	  footprint,	  including	  areas	  that	  may	  be	  
affected	  by	  terrain	  masking.	  
I_1.5.14	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  manage	  link	  security.	  
I_1.5.15	  The	  RPS	  should	  inform	  the	  pilot	  when	  a	  lost	  link	  is	  resumed.	  
I_1.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  identify	  which	  C2	  link	  settings	  are	  
active	  (e.g.	  selected	  frequency,	  satellite	  vs	  terrestrial).	  
I_1.5.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  to	  confirm	  that	  effective	  control	  is	  established	  
with	  the	  correct	  UA.	  
I_1.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  the	  geographic	  limits	  of	  the	  link.	  
I_1.5.5	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  spectrum	  activity	  from	  a	  spectrum	  
analyzer.	  
I_1.5.6	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  RPA	  is	  approaching	  an	  area	  where	  link	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  lost.	  
I_1.5.7	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  link	  is	  lost.	  
I_1.5.8	  The	  RPA	  will	  transmit	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  transponder	  code	  when	  the	  link	  is	  lost.	  
I_1.5.9	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  information	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  monitor	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  link.	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I_1.6.1	  The	  pilot	  should	  be	  presented	  with	  information	  necessary	  to	  confirm	  that	  flight-­‐critical	  settings	  
in	  the	  receiving	  RPS	  are	  consistent	  with	  settings	  in	  the	  giving	  RPS.	  
I_1.6.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  level	  of	  involvement	  indicator	  to	  the	  pilot	  to	  show	  whether	  the	  RPS	  has	  
been	  set	  to	  only	  receive	  telemetry	  from	  the	  UA,	  or	  to	  receive	  telemetry	  and	  transmit	  commands	  to	  the	  
UA.	  
I_2.2.1	  “The	  operator	  should	  be	  able	  to	  display	  flight	  corridors,	  controlled	  airspace	  and	  any	  other	  
relevant	  airspace	  co-­‐ordination	  information.”	  
I_2.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  display	  weather	  information	  to	  the	  pilot.	  
I_2.2.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  on	  the	  location	  of	  icing	  conditions.	  
I_2.2.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  RPA	  enters	  icing	  conditions.	  
I_2.2.5	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  when	  the	  RPA	  encounters	  significant	  air	  turbulence.	  
I_2.4.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  a	  display	  indicating	  the	  future	  flightpath	  of	  the	  aircraft	  
should	  a	  lost	  link	  occur.	  
I_2.4.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  alert	  the	  pilot	  whenever	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  procedure	  would	  create	  a	  
hazard	  (such	  as	  directing	  the	  aircraft	  towards	  terrain,	  or	  into	  non-­‐authorized	  airspace).	  
I_2.4.3	  The	  RPS	  should	  display	  to	  the	  pilot	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  will	  elapse	  between	  the	  onset	  of	  a	  lost	  
link	  event	  and	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  
I_2.4.4	  In	  the	  event	  of	  a	  lost	  link,	  the	  RPS	  should	  display	  the	  time	  remaining	  until	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  
aircraft’s	  lost	  link	  procedure.	  
I_2.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  real-­‐time	  imagery	  of	  the	  selected	  impact,	  ditching	  or	  
parachute	  descent	  site	  to	  confirm	  that	  a	  safe	  termination	  can	  be	  accomplished.	  
I_2.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  an	  alert	  to	  the	  pilot	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  flight	  termination	  system	  is	  
about	  to	  be	  activated.	  
I_3.1.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  include	  alternate	  means	  for	  the	  pilot	  to	  communicate	  with	  ATC	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  
loss	  of	  C2	  link.	  
I_3.1.2	  Current	  settings	  of	  communication	  controls.	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  information	  
about	  the	  current	  state,	  mode,	  or	  setting	  of	  the	  controls	  used	  for	  communication	  with	  ATC.	  
I_3.2.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  imagery	  of	  the	  aircraft	  whenever	  the	  pilot	  has	  control	  of	  
the	  aircraft	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  ground	  support	  personnel	  are	  interacting	  with	  the	  aircraft.	  
I_3.2.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  the	  pilot	  with	  a	  communication	  link	  with	  ground	  support	  personnel	  while	  
they	  are	  interacting	  with	  the	  aircraft.	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C_1.5.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  communication	  mode	  (e.g.	  terrestrial/satellite,	  
frequency,	  transmission	  power).	  
C_1.5.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  control	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  request	  a	  link	  status	  report.	  
C_1.5.3	  If	  antenna	  selection	  is	  performed	  by	  the	  pilot,	  then	  the	  RPS	  should	  support	  an	  external	  
command	  to	  set	  the	  antenna	  used	  for	  communication.	  
C_1.5.4	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  set	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  link	  outage	  that	  must	  occur	  before	  a	  
lost	  link	  response	  is	  triggered.	  
C_1.6.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  select	  the	  desired	  level	  of	  involvement	  with	  a	  UA,	  ranging	  
from	  monitoring	  telemetry	  without	  an	  active	  uplink,	  to	  telemetry	  with	  full	  control	  via	  an	  active	  
uplink.	  
C_1.6.2	  There	  should	  be	  a	  means	  for	  the	  giving	  and	  receiving	  pilots	  to	  communicate	  before,	  during	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Guidelines	  relating	  to	  properties	  of	  the	  interface	  
	  
P_1.1.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  not	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  disengage	  automation	  in	  flight	  if	  the	  aircraft	  will	  depart	  
from	  controlled	  flight	  as	  a	  result.	  
P_1.1.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  prevent	  multiple	  operators	  from	  operating	  the	  same	  application	  or	  procedure	  at	  
any	  one	  time.	  
P_1.1.3	  It	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  set	  an	  RPS	  to	  a	  receive	  only	  mode,	  in	  which	  the	  RPS	  displays	  information	  
downlinked	  from	  an	  RPA	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  active	  command	  link..	  
P_1.5.1	  “There	  must	  be	  an	  alert	  for	  the	  UAS	  [RPAS]	  crew,	  via	  a	  clear	  and	  distinct	  aural	  and	  visual	  signal,	  
for	  any	  total	  loss	  of	  the	  command	  and	  control	  data	  link.”	  
P_1.5.10	  The	  RPS,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  RPAS	  should	  comply	  with	  control	  link	  
latency	  (time	  from	  initiation	  of	  a	  maneuver	  to	  a	  measurable	  response	  by	  the	  RPA)	  requirements	  that	  are	  
established	  at	  a	  level	  similar	  to	  conventionally-­‐piloted	  aircraft.	  
P_1.5.2	  The	  aural	  warning	  for	  lost	  control	  link	  should	  be	  a	  unique	  sound,	  not	  also	  used	  to	  signify	  other	  
conditions.	  
P_1.5.3	  The	  maximum	  range	  of	  the	  C2	  datalink	  (datalink	  footprint)	  for	  all	  altitudes	  and	  directions	  
relative	  to	  the	  signal	  source	  should	  be	  presented	  visually	  to	  the	  pilot,	  overlaid	  on	  a	  map	  display.	  
P_1.5.4	  Areas	  where	  the	  C2	  link	  (datalink	  footprint)	  are	  predicted	  to	  be	  masked	  by	  terrain	  should	  be	  
displayed	  on	  the	  C2	  datalink	  display.	  
P_1.5.5	  If	  the	  datalink	  footprint	  can	  be	  suppressed,	  it	  should	  be	  automatically	  displayed	  when	  the	  RPA	  is	  
approaching	  a	  location	  where	  a	  loss	  of	  link	  is	  likely.	  
P_1.5.6	  The	  C2	  datalink	  footprint	  should	  be	  easily	  distinguishable	  from	  other	  footprints	  that	  may	  be	  
present	  on	  the	  operator	  map	  display.	  
P_1.5.7	  If	  the	  payload	  utilizes	  a	  link	  separate	  to	  the	  aircraft	  control	  link,	  any	  display	  of	  payload	  link	  
quality	  should	  be	  separate	  and	  clearly	  distinguishable	  from	  displays	  for	  the	  aircraft	  control	  link.	  
P_1.5.8	  If	  an	  aural	  warning	  is	  used	  to	  indicate	  loss	  of	  payload	  link,	  the	  sound	  should	  be	  dissimilar	  to	  that	  
used	  to	  indicate	  loss	  of	  control	  link.	  
P_1.5.9	  Security	  features	  designed	  to	  prevent	  unapproved	  access	  (logon	  and	  logoff	  functions)	  should	  
not	  result	  in	  inadvertent	  lockouts	  of	  authorized	  personnel.	  
P_1.6.1	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  suitable	  displays	  to	  enable	  briefings	  to	  be	  conducted	  between	  a	  seated	  




P_1.6.2	  The	  RPS	  should	  enable	  control	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  another	  RPS	  without	  any	  gap	  in	  control	  
occurring	  during	  the	  handover.	  
P_2.1.1	  Map	  displays	  should	  be	  able	  to	  support	  a	  variety	  of	  map	  types	  including	  aeronautical	  charts	  and	  
presentations	  of	  Digital	  Terrain	  Elevation	  Data	  (DTED).	  
P_2.1.2	  Map	  displays	  should	  be	  configurable	  to	  “North	  up”	  or	  “Track	  up”.	  
P_2.1.3	  If	  control	  is	  via	  a	  terrestrial	  radio,	  the	  location	  of	  (or	  direction	  to)	  the	  ground	  
transmitter/receiver	  should	  be	  shown	  on	  the	  map.	  
P_2.1.4	  Primary	  flight	  controls	  for	  controlling	  the	  RPA	  (heading,	  attitude,	  speed)	  should	  be	  available	  at	  
all	  times	  through	  dedicated	  physical	  controls.	  	  If	  the	  use	  of	  software-­‐based	  controls	  cannot	  be	  avoided,	  
then	  the	  controls	  should	  be	  immediately	  accessible	  at	  the	  top	  level	  of	  the	  control	  interface.	  
P_2.4.1	  The	  flightpath	  that	  would	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  aircraft	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  lost	  link	  should	  be	  clearly	  
distinguishable	  from	  the	  programmed	  normal	  flightpath	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  
P_2.4.2	  Information	  on	  the	  programmed	  lost	  link	  behavior	  of	  the	  aircraft	  should	  be	  readily	  available	  to	  
the	  pilot,	  without	  the	  need	  for	  complex	  interactions	  with	  the	  human-­‐machine	  interface.	  
P_2.5.1	  When	  the	  RPA	  is	  equipped	  with	  a	  flight	  termination	  system:	  
P_2.5.1a.	  The	  use	  of	  these	  controls	  should	  be	  intuitive	  and	  minimize	  the	  possibility	  of	  confusion	  and	  
subsequent	  inadvertent	  operation.	  
P_2.5.1b.	  Two	  distinct	  and	  dissimilar	  actions	  of	  the	  RPAS	  crew	  should	  be	  required	  to	  initiate	  the	  flight	  
termination	  command.	  
P_2.5.2	  Before	  the	  final	  step	  in	  activating	  the	  flight	  termination	  system	  is	  reached,	  the	  RPS	  should	  
provide	  an	  aural	  and	  visual	  alert	  to	  the	  pilot	  that	  flight	  termination	  is	  about	  to	  be	  activated.	  
P_2.5.3	  The	  aural	  alert	  warning	  of	  imminent	  flight	  termination	  should	  involve	  a	  unique	  sound.	  This	  
should	  preferably	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  verbal	  message	  such	  as	  “Flight	  termination!”	  
P_2.5.4	  When	  the	  RPA	  is	  equipped	  with	  a	  flight	  termination	  system,	  flight	  termination	  controls	  should	  
be	  safeguarded	  from	  interference	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  inadvertent	  operation.	  
P_3.1.1	  The	  voice	  communication	  delay	  between	  the	  pilot	  and	  ATC	  should	  have	  a	  mean	  less	  than	  or	  
equal	  to	  250	  ms.	  
P_3.1.2	  The	  voice	  communication	  delay	  between	  the	  pilot	  and	  ATC	  should	  be	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  300	  
ms.	  (99th	  percentile).	  











G_1	  RPAS	  developers	  should	  follow	  recognized	  human-­‐centered	  design	  processes	  including	  the	  
following:	  
G_1a.	  Develop	  a	  full	  set	  of	  pilot	  tasks	  and	  intended	  operations	  for	  which	  the	  RPS	  will	  be	  used.	  	  
These	  will	  help	  drive	  ensuring	  a	  thorough	  design	  that	  provides	  all	  systems,	  information,	  and	  
controls	  that	  the	  pilots	  will	  need.	  
G_1b.	  Develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  potential	  safety	  critical	  errors	  that	  the	  pilots	  may	  make	  
when	  accomplishing	  their	  tasks.	  	  These	  will	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  making	  trade-­‐offs	  in	  
design	  decisions	  by	  focusing	  on	  design	  attributes	  that	  will	  mitigate	  critical	  errors	  as	  needed.	  
G_1c.	  Develop	  a	  full	  set	  of	  information	  requirements	  for	  the	  tasks	  the	  pilots	  will	  need	  to	  
accomplish.	  	  These	  requirements	  should	  be	  developed	  with	  other	  design	  requirements	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  systems	  engineering	  process.	  	  They	  will	  help	  ensure	  that	  the	  appropriate	  
information	  is	  provided	  to	  the	  pilots	  and	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  making	  design	  decisions.	  
G_1d.	  Develop	  a	  full	  set	  of	  requirements	  for	  controls	  that	  the	  pilot	  will	  need	  to	  accomplish	  their	  
tasks.	  	  These	  requirements	  should	  be	  developed	  with	  other	  design	  requirements	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  systems	  engineering	  process.	  	  They	  will	  help	  ensure	  that	  all	  the	  pilot	  controls	  
are	  planned	  for	  as	  design	  decisions	  are	  made.	  
G_1e.	  Document	  all	  of	  the	  results	  of	  these	  processes	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  continually	  updated	  
when	  design	  decisions	  and	  trade-­‐offs	  are	  made	  during	  the	  design	  process.	  	  Good	  documentation	  
will	  also	  help	  the	  human	  factors	  design	  processes	  to	  be	  integrated	  with	  the	  other	  systems	  
engineering	  development	  and	  design	  processes.	  
G_2	  The	  use	  of	  multi-­‐mode	  functions	  on	  flight	  controls	  should	  be	  minimized.	  If	  modes	  are	  used,	  the	  
system	  should	  clearly	  indicate	  the	  current	  mode,	  and	  other	  potential	  modes	  should	  be	  indicated.	  
G_3	  If	  changing	  a	  mode	  selection	  of	  an	  automated	  system	  has	  a	  safety	  consequence,	  the	  action	  to	  select	  
that	  mode	  should	  be	  alerted,	  and	  additional	  precautions	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  prevent	  inadvertent	  
selection.	  
G_4	  Payload	  controls	  should	  be	  separate	  from	  controls	  with	  safety-­‐of-­‐flight	  functions.	  
G_5	  It	  should	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  reconfigure	  a	  safety-­‐of-­‐flight	  control	  to	  perform	  a	  payload	  function.	  
G_6	  Activation	  of	  a	  key	  or	  button	  should	  provide	  tactile	  or	  auditory	  feedback	  to	  the	  pilot.	  
G_7	  There	  should	  be	  a	  clear	  indication	  to	  the	  pilot	  when	  a	  command	  has	  been	  received	  by	  the	  RPA.	  
G_8	  Any	  unrecognized	  entry	  made	  by	  the	  pilot	  at	  the	  RPS	  should	  cause	  an	  informative	  error	  message	  to	  
be	  displayed	  and	  not	  affect	  the	  status	  or	  operation	  of	  any	  system.	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G_9	  Flightcrew	  alerting.	  (Quoted	  verbatim	  from	  CFR	  §	  25.1322)	  
G_9	  “(a)	  Flightcrew	  alerts	  must:	  (1)	  Provide	  the	  flightcrew	  with	  the	  information	  needed	  to:	  (i)	  
Identify	  non-­‐normal	  operation	  or	  airplane	  system	  conditions,	  and	  (ii)	  Determine	  the	  appropriate	  
actions,	  if	  any.	  (2)	  Be	  readily	  and	  easily	  detectable	  and	  intelligible	  by	  the	  flightcrew	  under	  all	  
foreseeable	  operating	  conditions,	  including	  conditions	  where	  multiple	  alerts	  are	  provided.	  (3)	  Be	  
removed	  when	  the	  alerting	  condition	  no	  longer	  exists.	  
G_9	  (b)	  Alerts	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  following	  prioritization	  hierarchy	  based	  on	  the	  urgency	  of	  
flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  response.	  (1)	  Warning:	  For	  conditions	  that	  require	  immediate	  
flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  immediate	  flightcrew	  response.	  (2)	  Caution:	  For	  conditions	  that	  
require	  immediate	  flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  subsequent	  flightcrew	  response.	  (3)	  Advisory:	  For	  
conditions	  that	  require	  flightcrew	  awareness	  and	  may	  require	  subsequent	  flightcrew	  response.	  
G_9	  (c)	  Warning	  and	  caution	  alerts	  must:	  (1)	  Be	  prioritized	  within	  each	  category,	  when	  
necessary.	  (2)	  Provide	  timely	  attention-­‐getting	  cues	  through	  at	  least	  two	  different	  senses	  by	  a	  
combination	  of	  aural,	  visual,	  or	  tactile	  indications.	  (3)	  Permit	  each	  occurrence	  of	  the	  attention-­‐
getting	  cues	  required	  by	  paragraph	  (c)(2)	  of	  this	  section	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  and	  suppressed,	  
unless	  they	  are	  required	  to	  be	  continuous.	  
G_9	  (d)	  The	  alert	  function	  must	  be	  designed	  to	  minimize	  the	  effects	  of	  false	  and	  nuisance	  alerts.	  
In	  particular,	  it	  must	  be	  designed	  to:	  (1)	  Prevent	  the	  presentation	  of	  an	  alert	  that	  is	  
inappropriate	  or	  unnecessary.	  (2)	  Provide	  a	  means	  to	  suppress	  an	  attention-­‐getting	  component	  
of	  an	  alert	  caused	  by	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  alerting	  function	  that	  interferes	  with	  the	  flightcrew's	  ability	  
to	  safely	  operate	  the	  airplane.	  This	  means	  must	  not	  be	  readily	  available	  to	  the	  flightcrew	  so	  that	  
it	  could	  be	  operated	  inadvertently	  or	  by	  habitual	  reflexive	  action.	  When	  an	  alert	  is	  suppressed,	  
there	  must	  be	  a	  clear	  and	  unmistakable	  annunciation	  to	  the	  flightcrew	  that	  the	  alert	  has	  been	  
suppressed.	  
G_9	  (e)	  Visual	  alert	  indications	  must:	  (1)	  Conform	  to	  the	  following	  color	  convention:(i)	  Red	  for	  
warning	  alert	  indications.	  (ii)	  Amber	  or	  yellow	  for	  caution	  alert	  indications.	  (iii)	  Any	  color	  except	  
red	  or	  green	  for	  advisory	  alert	  indications.	  (2)	  Use	  visual	  coding	  techniques,	  together	  with	  other	  
alerting	  function	  elements	  on	  the	  flight	  deck,	  to	  distinguish	  between	  warning,	  caution,	  and	  
advisory	  alert	  indications,	  if	  they	  are	  presented	  on	  monochromatic	  displays	  that	  are	  not	  capable	  
of	  conforming	  to	  the	  color	  convention	  in	  paragraph	  (e)(1)	  of	  this	  section.	  
G_9	  (f)	  Use	  of	  the	  colors	  red,	  amber,	  and	  yellow	  on	  the	  flight	  deck	  for	  functions	  other	  than	  
flightcrew	  alerting	  must	  be	  limited	  and	  must	  not	  adversely	  affect	  flightcrew	  alerting.”	  
G_10	  Systems	  that	  alert	  the	  pilot	  to	  a	  critical	  anomaly	  should	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  silent	  failure.	  
G_11	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  work	  environment	  that	  maintains	  pilot	  engagement,	  and	  minimizes	  the	  
negative	  impact	  of	  extended	  periods	  of	  low	  workload.	  
G_12	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  consistency	  of	  operation	  for	  common	  functions.	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G_13	  The	  functions	  needed	  to	  safely	  control	  the	  aircraft	  under	  usual	  flight	  situations	  should	  be	  located	  
in	  the	  pilot's	  primary	  field-­‐of-­‐view.	  
G_14	  Warnings	  and	  cautions	  should	  not	  be	  obscured	  by	  other	  RPS	  displays.	  
G_15	  “Part-­‐time	  display.	  If	  it	  is	  desired	  to	  inhibit	  some	  parameters	  from	  full-­‐time	  display,	  an	  equivalent	  
level	  of	  safety	  to	  full-­‐time	  display	  should	  be	  demonstrated.	  Criteria	  to	  be	  considered	  include	  the	  
following:	  (a)	  Continuous	  display	  of	  the	  parameter	  is	  not	  required	  for	  safety	  of	  flight	  in	  all	  normal	  flight	  
phases.	  (b)	  The	  parameter	  is	  automatically	  displayed	  in	  flight	  phases	  where	  it	  is	  required.	  (c)	  The	  
inhibited	  parameter	  is	  automatically	  displayed	  when	  its	  value	  indicates	  an	  abnormal	  condition,	  or	  when	  
the	  parameter	  reaches	  an	  abnormal	  value.	  (d)	  Display	  of	  the	  inhibited	  parameter	  can	  be	  manually	  
selected	  by	  the	  UAV	  crew	  without	  interfering	  with	  the	  display	  of	  other	  required	  information.	  (e)	  If	  the	  
parameter	  fails	  to	  be	  displayed	  when	  required,	  the	  failure	  effect	  and	  compounding	  effects	  must	  meet	  
the	  requirements	  of	  USAR.1309.	  The	  analysis	  is	  to	  clearly	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  display(s)	  of	  data	  is	  
consistent	  with	  safe	  operation	  under	  all	  probable	  operating	  conditions.	  (f)	  The	  automatic,	  or	  requested,	  
display	  of	  the	  inhibited	  parameter	  should	  not	  create	  unacceptable	  clutter	  on	  the	  display;	  simultaneous	  
multiple	  "pop-­‐ups"	  must	  be	  considered.	  (g)	  If	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  new	  parameter	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  self-­‐
evident,	  suitable	  alerting	  must	  accompany	  the	  automatic	  presentation.”	  
G_16	  Wherever	  possible,	  text	  messages,	  whether	  in	  dialog	  boxes,	  warning	  messages	  or	  other	  screen	  
displays,	  should	  be	  presented	  in	  plain	  language,	  or	  using	  standard	  aviation	  terminology.	  
G_17	  Controls	  intended	  to	  be	  operated	  by	  the	  pilot	  should	  be	  reachable	  from	  a	  seated	  position	  
G_18	  The	  RPS	  should	  provide	  a	  bookrest	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  to	  refer	  to	  documents	  without	  risk	  that	  the	  
document	  will	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  keyboard	  or	  other	  flight	  controls.	  
G_19	  Appropriate	  priority	  controls	  should	  be	  available	  for	  RPAS	  functions	  that	  require	  either	  quick	  
accessibility	  or	  constant	  availability.	  Priority	  control	  devices	  can	  include,	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to:	  (a)	  Touch	  
panels,	  (b)	  Buttons,	  (c)	  Switches,	  (d)	  Joysticks,	  (e)	  Keyboard	  shortcuts.	  
G_20	  If	  a	  display	  screen	  enables	  the	  pilot	  to	  move	  or	  rearrange	  display	  or	  control	  windows,	  it	  should	  not	  
be	  possible	  to	  place	  a	  window	  so	  as	  to	  obscure	  primary	  flight	  controls	  or	  displays.	  
	   	  
	  75	  
	  
Definitions	  of	  terms	  
	  
Control	  input:	  Inputs	  that	  the	  engineered	  system	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  receiving	  from	  the	  human.	  The	  
requirement	  may	  specify	  key	  attributes	  of	  the	  input,	  such	  as	  timing	  and	  precision,	  but	  will	  remain	  
agnostic	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  device	  used	  to	  make	  the	  input.	  
	  
Conventional	  aviation,	  and	  conventionally-­‐piloted	  aircraft:	  Aircraft	  controlled	  by	  an	  on-­‐board	  pilot.	  	  	  
	  
Engineered	  system:	  The	  non-­‐human	  components	  of	  the	  system,	  comprising	  facilities,	  parts,	  equipment,	  
tools,	  materials	  &	  software.	  
	  
General	  guideline:	  A	  human	  factors	  principle	  that	  relates	  to	  whole-­‐of-­‐system	  functioning,	  or	  that	  has	  
broad	  applicability	  across	  the	  engineered	  system.	  	  
	  
Human	  factors:	  A	  body	  of	  knowledge	  about	  human	  abilities,	  human	  limitations,	  and	  other	  human	  
characteristics	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  design	  (Chapanis,	  1991).	  	  
	  
Human-­‐centered	  design	  process:	  An	  activity	  performed	  during	  the	  design	  and	  development	  phase	  to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  system	  will	  operate	  safely	  and	  effectively,	  and	  will	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  capabilities	  
and	  limitations	  of	  the	  human	  operator.	  	  
	  
Human	  factors	  engineering:	  The	  application	  of	  human	  factors	  information	  to	  the	  design	  of	  tools,	  
machines,	  systems,	  tasks,	  jobs,	  and	  environments	  for	  safe,	  comfortable,	  and	  effective	  human	  use	  
Chapanis	  (1991).	  
	  
Human	  factors	  guideline:	  A	  statement	  describing	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  engineered	  system	  with	  the	  
intention	  of	  promoting	  safe	  and	  effective	  human	  use	  (Adapted	  from	  Chapanis,	  1991).	  	  
	  
Human	  task:	  A	  task	  description	  is	  composed	  of	  an	  actor,	  a	  verb	  and	  an	  object.	  Qualifying	  phrases	  may	  
be	  included	  if	  needed	  for	  clarification.	  
	  
Information	  content	  of	  displays:	  Information	  that	  must	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  engineered	  system	  to	  the	  
human	  to	  enable	  a	  task	  to	  be	  performed.	  The	  requirement	  may	  specify	  key	  attributes	  of	  the	  
information,	  such	  as	  accuracy,	  timing,	  and	  usability,	  but	  will	  remain	  agnostic	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  medium	  
used	  to	  transmit	  the	  information.	  
	  
Property	  of	  the	  interface:	  Specifications	  of	  desired	  physical	  or	  functional	  properties	  of	  controls	  or	  
displays.	  Physical	  properties	  are	  characteristics	  that	  are	  directly	  observable,	  such	  as	  shape	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